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Abstract
We study communication over multiple access channels (MAC) where one of the users is possibly adversarial.
When all users behave non-adversarially, we want their messages to be decoded reliably. When an adversary is
present, we consider two different decoding guarantees.
In part I, we require that the honest users’ messages be decoded reliably. We study the three-user MAC1. We
characterize the capacity region for randomized codes (where each user shares an independent secret key with the
receiver). We also study the capacity region for deterministic codes. We obtain necessary conditions including a
new non-symmetrizability condition for this capacity region to be non-trivial. We show that when none of the
users are symmetrizable, the randomized coding capacity region is also achievable with deterministic codes. This
is analogous to the result of Ahlswede and Cai (1991) for arbitrarily varying MAC.
In part II, we consider the weaker goal of authenticated communication where we only require that an ad-
versarial user must not be able to cause an undetected error on the honest users’ messages. Therefore, when an
adversarial user is present, it is sufficient to detect its presence without decoding the message of the honest user.
For the two-user MAC, we show that the following three-phase scheme is rate-optimal: a standard MAC code is
first used to achieve unauthenticated communication; this is followed by two authentication phases where each
user authenticates their message treating the other user as a possible adversary. We show that the authentication
phases can be very short since this form of authentication itself, when possible, can be achieved for message sets
whose size grow doubly exponentially in blocklength. This leads to our result that the authenticated communica-
tion capacity region of a discrete memoryless MAC is either zero or the (unauthenticated) MAC capacity region
itself. This also, arguably, explains the similar nature of authenticated communication capacity of a discrete
memoryless point-to-point adversarial channel recently found by Kosut and Kliewer (ITW, 2018). We also obtain
analogous results for additive Gaussian noise channels.
1It turns out that the capacity region for the two-user MAC follows from the capacity of the point-to-point arbitrarily varying channel.
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Part 1
Reliable Communication in the Presence of an
Adversarial User
1.1 Introduction
Consider a multiple access channel (MAC) in which at most one of the users may behave adversarially (Fig. 1). If
all users are non-adversarial, we require that their messages be reliably decoded. However, if one of the users is
adversarial, the decoder must correctly recover the message of all the other (honest) users.
For the two-user MAC, clearly, each user can at least achieve the capacity of the arbitrarily varying channels
(AVC) [1] that amounts to treating the other user’s input as channel state. Further, it is also easy to see that no
higher rate is possible as the other user can behave exactly like an adversary in the AVC setup. Thus, the capacity
region is the rectangular region defined by the AVC capacities of the two users’ channels, i.e., there is no trade-off
between the rates2. Here we study the three-user MAC and characterize the randomized coding capacity. We also
characterize the deterministic coding capacity under average probability of error for most channels.3
Our problem is closely related to the two-user arbitrarily varying MACs (AV-MAC), which has an external
adversary (jammer) unlike in our problem. For this setup, Jahn [2] obtained the randomized coding capacity where
each user has an independent source of randomness (secret key) which is shared with the receiver. He also showed
that this region is also the deterministic coding capacity region under average probability of error whenever the
latter has a non-empty interior, a result along the lines of Ahlswede’s dichotomy for arbitrarily varying channels [3].
Gubner [4] proved necessary conditions (non-symmetrizability conditions) for capacity to be non-zero. Gubner’s
notion of non-symmetrizability of AV-MACs generalizes the corresponding notion of AVCs. In particular, he defined
an AV-MAC to be non-symmetrizable if it is not symmetrizable in any of the following three senses – (i) the AV-MAC
can be symmetrized for the first user’s input while keeping second user’s input unchanged, (ii) the AV-MAC can be
symmetrized for the second user’s input while keeping first user’s input unchanged, and (iii) the AV-MAC can be
simultaneously symmetrized for both users’ inputs. Ahlswede and Cai [5] showed that Gubner’s necessary conditions
are also sufficient for the deterministic coding capacity region to have a non-empty interior. Recently, Pereg and
Steinberg [6] obtained the capacity region for arbitrarily varying MAC with state constraints. They also closed the
gap for the problem without state constraints by addressing the case where exactly one of the users has zero capacity.
There are several other related works. Wiese and Boche [7] considered two-user arbitrarily varying multiple
access channels with conferencing encoders. La and Anantharam [8] studied MACs with strategic users modeled
as a cooperative game. In part II of this paper (also see [9]), we consider authenticated communication over a
two-user MAC where at most one user may be adversarial. Compared to the one we consider here, authentication is
a weaker goal – ensure reliable decoding when both users are non-adversarial, however, if one of the users behaves
adversarially, the decoder (with high probability) must either output the correct message for the honest user or
abort, i.e., an adversary should not be able to cause an undetected erroneous output for the honest user. Byzantine
attacks on the nodes and edges of networks have been studied under omniscient and weaker adversarial models in [10]
and [11, 12], respectively.
Returning to our problem, the capacity characterizations for AV-MACs [2,4–6] shed light on the nature of capacity
region for our problem. It is clear that, at the very least, if a rate triple (R1, R2, R3) is achievable for our setting, then
the rate pair (R2, R3) must also be achievable over the two-user AV-MAC W
(1) that is formed by treating user-1’s
input as the adversarially chosen state. Similarly, the rate pairs (R1, R3) and (R1, R2) must also be achievable over
corresponding AV-MACs W (2) and W (3) respectively.4
2This observation holds true under deterministic coding, stochastic encoding (where the encoders have private randomness), and
randomized coding settings under both maximum and average probabilities of error. A similar observation can be made for any k-user
MAC where up to k − 1 users may adversarially collude
3Our characterization is incomplete for channels in which some, but not all users are symmetrizable. See remark 1.1.
4In fact, a stronger necessary condition follows by noting that the encoder of each user must not depend on the knowledge of which
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Figure 1: Adversarial MAC: At most one user may be adversarial. Reliable decoding of the messages of all honest users is required.
Clearly, no decoding guarantees are given for an adversarial user.
In particular, it follows that the capacity region for our problem has an empty interior whenever any of the
AV-MACs W (1), W (2), and W (3) are symmetrizable in the sense of Gubner’s characterization. One of the main
contributions of our work is to show that, in addition to the nine symmetrizability conditions inherited from above
(three for eachW (k)), fully characterizing non-symmetrizability of our adversarial MAC relies on also excluding three
additional symmetrizability conditions (Eq. (6)). Roughly speaking, each of these conditions reflect whether or not
an adversarial user at a node k can attack in a manner that is also consistent with an adversarial user at a node
j 6= k while resulting in a decoding ambiguity about the remaining user’s message (see Figure 4). Example 1.1 shows
that the new symmetrizability conditions proposed in this paper are not redundant in view of the symmetrizability
conditions derived from two-user AV-MACs.
On the achievability side, we show that as long as our adversarial MAC is non-symmetrizable, i.e., none of the
twelve symmetrizability conditions hold, the capacity region for our problem equals the randomized capacity region.5
1.2 Problem Setup and Main Results
1.2.1 System model
Consider the three-user MAC setup shown in Fig. 1. The memoryless channel WY |X1,X2,X3 has input alphabets
X1,X2,X3, and output alphabet Y.
Definition 1.1 (Deterministic code). An (N 1, N2, N3, n) deterministic code for the DM-MAC WY |X1,X2,X3 consists
of the following:
(i) three message sets, Mi = {1, . . . , N i}, i = 1, 2, 3,
(ii) three encoders, fi :Mi → Xni , i = 1, 2, 3, and
(iii) a decoder, φ : Yn →M1 ×M2 ×M3.
user, if any, is the adversary. Thus, as in compound channels, the same code should work regardless of the W (k) that represents the
actual channel. We use this observation in our converse arguments.
5As in [2], in the randomized setting, each user may share an unlimited number of random bits with the decoder that are unknown to
other users.
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We define the average probability error Pe as the maximum of average probabilities under the four scenarios
where at most one user is adversarial. Let (Mˆ1, Mˆ2, Mˆ3) = φ(Y
n).
Pe(f1, f2, f3, φ)
def
= max{Pe,0, Pe,1, Pe,2, Pe,3},
where the terms on the right-hand side are defined below. Note that our notation suppresses their dependence on
the code. Pe,0 is the average probability of error when none of the users are adversarial,
Pe,0
def
=
1
N1N2N3
∑
m1,m2,m3
e0(m1,m2,m3), where
e0(m1,m2,m3) = P
(
(Mˆ1, Mˆ2, Mˆ3) 6= (m1,m2,m3)
∣∣∣
Xn1 = f1(m1), X
n
2 = f2(m2), X
n
3 = f3(m3)
)
.
Pe,i, i = 1, 2, 3 is the average error when user-i is adversarial. Pe,1 is as below, Pe,2, Pe,3 can be defined similarly.
Pe,1
def
= max
xn1
1
N2N3
∑
m2,m3
e1(x
n
1 ,m2,m3), where
e1(x
n
1 ,m2,m3) = P
(
(Mˆ2, Mˆ3) 6= (m2,m3)
∣∣∣
Xn1 = x
n
1 , X
n
2 = f2(m2), X
n
3 = f3(m3)
)
.
We emphasize that the decoder is unaware of whether any of the users is adversarial and the identity of the adversarial
user (if any). We also note that Pe,0 ≤ Pe,1 + Pe,2 + Pe,3.
We say a rate triple (R1, R2, R3) is achievable if there is a sequence of (⌊2nR1⌋, ⌊2nR2⌋, ⌊2nR3⌋, n) codes {f (n)1 , f (n)2 , f (n)3 ,
φ(n)}∞n=1 such that limn→∞ Pe(f (n)1 , f (n)2 , f (n)3 , φ(n)) → 0. The deterministic coding capacity region Rdeterministic is
the closure of the set of all achievable rate triples.
Definition 1.2 (Randomized code). An (N1, N2, N3, n) randomized code for the DM-MAC WY |X1,X2,X3 consists
of the following:
(i) three message sets, Mi = {1, . . . , N i}, i = 1, 2, 3,
(ii) three independent randomized encoders, Fi :Mi → Xni where Fi takes values in Fi, i = 1, 2, 3 and
(iii) a privately randomized decoder, Φ : Yn × F1 × F2 × F3 → M1 × M2 × M3 where Φ(yn, F1, F2, F3) =
(Ψ1(y
n, F1, F2, F3),Ψ2(y
n, F1, F2, F3),Ψ3(y
n, F1, F2, F3)) for some randomized functions Ψi : Yn × F1 × F2 ×
F3 →M1 ×M2 ×M3, i = 1, 2, 3.
This is analogous to the randomized code of Jahn [2] for 2-user AV-MACs. Probability of error and capacity
region for randomized codes can be defined similarly6. We will consider the natural setting where the adversarial
user has access to its random encoding map and denote its randomized coding capacity region by Rrandom. We also
consider two slightly artificial settings – (i) adversarial user-i is a strong adversary if it may choose its encoding map
fi in addition to the input vector x
n
i , and (ii) an adversary is a weak adversary if it does not have access to its random
encoding map when choosing its input vector. We denote the corresponding randomized coding capacity region by
Rstrongrandom and Rweakrandom respectively. Clearly, Rstrongrandom ⊆ Rrandom ⊆ Rweakrandom. Analogous to the deterministic case,
the average probability error P stronge under the strong adversary is defined as
P stronge (F1, F2, F3,Φ)
def
= max{P rande,0 , P stronge,1 , P stronge,2 , P stronge,3 },
6Clearly, for randomized codes, the capacity region will remain unchanged for maximum and average probabilities of error criteria.
Hence we only consider the average error criterion here.
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where
P rande,0
def
=
1
N1N2N3
∑
m1,m2,m3
erand0 (m1,m2,m3), where
erand0 (m1,m2,m3) = P
(
Φ(Y n, F1, F2, F3) 6= (m1,m2,m3)
∣∣∣Xn1 = F1(m1), Xn2 = F2(m2), Xn3 = F3(m3)).
P stronge,1 is as below, P
strong
e,2 , P
strong
e,3 can be defined similarly.
P stronge,1
def
= max
xn1∈X
n,f1∈F1
1
N2N3
∑
m2,m3
estrongf1 (x
n
1 ,m2,m3), where
estrongf1 (x
n
1 ,m2,m3) = P
(
(Ψ2(Y
n, f1, F2, F3),Ψ3(Y
n, f1, F2, F3)) 6= (m2,m3)
∣∣∣Xn1 = xn1 , Xn2 = F2(m2), Xn3 = F3(m3)).
We say a rate triple (R1, R2, R3) is achievable against the strong adversary, if there is a sequence of (⌊2nR1⌋, ⌊2nR2⌋, ⌊2nR3⌋, n)
codes {F (n)1 , F (n)2 , F (n)3 ,Φ(n)}∞n=1 such that limn→∞ P stronge (F (n)1 , F (n)2 , F (n)3 ,Φ(n))→ 0. The strong randomized cod-
ing capacity region Rstrongrandom is the closure of the set of all achievable rate triples.
Probability of error and capacity region for randomized codes with weak adversary can be defined by replacing
P stronge,i with P
weak
e,i , i = 1, 2, 3 in the above definition, where
Pweake,1
def
= max
xn1∈X
n
1
N2N3
∑
m2,m3
eweak1 (x
n
1 ,m2,m3), (1)
where eweak1 (x
n
1 ,m2,m3) = P
(
(Ψ2(Y
n, F1, F2, F3),Ψ3(Y
n, F1, F2, F3)) 6= (m2,m3)
∣∣∣
Xn1 = x
n
1 , X
n
2 = F2(m2), X
n
3 = F3(m3)
)
.
Pweake,2 and P
weak
e,3 can be defined similarly.
For the standard adversary who has access to the random encoding map but is not allowed to choose it, the probability
of error and capacity region can be defined in a similar fashion, by replacing P stronge,i with P
random
e,i , i = 1, 2, 3. We
define P randome,1 below. P
rand
e,2 and P
rand
e,3 can be defined similarly.
P rande,1
def
= max
xn1 :F1→X
n
1
N2N3
∑
m2,m3
erand1 (x
n
1 (·),m2,m3), where
erand1 (x
n
1 (·),m2,m3) = P
(
(Ψ2(Y
n, F1, F2, F3),Ψ3(Y
n, F1, F2, F3)) 6= (m2,m3)
∣∣∣Xn1 = xn1 (F1), Xn2 = F2(m2), Xn3 = F3(m3)).
The notation xn1 (F1) signifies that the adversary can choose the sequence x
n
1 with the knowledge of the encoding
map F1. The capacity region in this setting is denoted by Rrandom.
1.2.2 Randomized coding capacity region
Let R be the closure of the set of all rate triples (R1, R2, R3) such that for some p(u)p(x1|u)p(x2|u)p(x3|u) the
following conditions hold for all permutations (i, j, k) of (1, 2, 3):
Ri ≤ min
q(xk|u)
I(Xi;Y |Xj , U), and (2)
Ri +Rj ≤ min
q(xk|u)
I(Xi, Xj ;Y |U), (3)
where the mutual information terms above are evaluated using the joint distribution p(u)p(xi|u)p(xj |u)q(xk|u)
WY |X1,X2,X3(y|x1, x2, x3). Here |U| ≤ 3.
Theorem 1.1.
Rstrongrandom = Rrandom = Rweakrandom = R.
We prove this by showing an achievability for the strong adversary and a converse for the weak adversary.
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Figure 2: We say WY |X1,X2,X3 is X2 × X3-symmetrizable by X1 if, for each (x2, x˜2, x3, x˜3), the conditional output distributions in the
two cases above are the same. Thus, the receiver is unable to tell whether users 2 and 3 are sending (x2, x3) or (x˜2, x˜3).
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Figure 3: We say WY |X1,X2,X3 is X3|X2-symmetrizable by X1 if, for each (x2, x3, x˜3), the conditional output distributions in the two
cases above are the same. The receiver is unable to tell whether user 3 is sending x3 or x˜3.
1.2.3 Deterministic coding capacity region
Theorem 1.2.
Rdeterministic = R, if int(Rdeterministic) 6= ∅.
The proof uses an extension of the elimination technique [2, 3] to first show that n2-valued randomness at each
encoder is sufficient to achieve any rate-triple in Rweakrandom. A deterministic code of small rate can be used to send
2 log2 n bits out of each message. These message bits are then used as the encoder randomness in the next phase to
communicate the rest of the message bits using a randomized code.
Definition 1.3. Let (i, j, k) be some permutation of (1, 2, 3). We define three symmetrizability conditions for
WY |X1,X2,X3 .
1. We say that WY |X1,X2,X3 is Xj ×Xk-symmetrizable by Xi if for some distribution q(xi|xj , xk)∑
xi
q(xi|x˜j , x˜k)WY |Xi,Xj ,Xk(y|xi, xj , xk)
=
∑
xi
q(xi|xj , xk)WY |Xi,Xj ,Xk(y|xi, x˜j , x˜k),
∀ xj , x˜j ∈ Xj , xk, x˜k ∈ Xk, y ∈ Y. (4)
2. We say that WY |X1,X2,X3 is Xk|Xj-symmetrizable by Xi if for some distribution q(xi|xk)∑
xi
q(xi|x˜k)WY |Xi,Xj ,Xk(y|xi, xj , xk)
=
∑
xi
q(xi|xk)WY |Xi,Xj ,Xk(y|xi, xj , x˜k),
∀ xj ∈ Xj , xk, x˜k ∈ Xk, y ∈ Y. (5)
3. We say that WY |X1,X2,X3 is Xk-symmetrizable by Xi/Xj if for some pair of distributions q(x˜i|xi, xk) and
q′(x˜j |xj , xk) ∑
x˜i
q(x˜i|xi, x˜k)WY |Xi,Xj ,Xk(y|x˜i, xj , xk)
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Figure 4: We say WY |X1,X2,X3 is X3-symmetrizable by X1/X2 if, for each (x1, x2, x3, x˜3), the conditional output distributions in the
two cases above are the same. The receiver is unable to tell whether user 3 is sending x3 (and user 1 being malicious) or user 3 is sending
x˜3 (and user 2 being malicious).
=
∑
x˜j
q′(x˜j |xj , xk)WY |Xi,Xj ,Xk(y|xi, x˜j , x˜k),
∀ xi ∈ Xi, xj ∈ Xj , xk, x˜k ∈ Xk, y ∈ Y. (6)
We will say that user-k is symmetrizable if any of the above three symmetrizability conditions (4)-(6) holds for
some distinct i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} \ {k}. And, we will say that the channel WY |X1,X2,X3 is not symmetrizable if none of
the users are symmetrizable, i.e., the channel is not Xj × Xk-symmetrizable by Xi, Xk|Xj-symmetrizable by Xi, and
Xk-symmetrizable by Xi/Xj for all permutations (i, j, k) of (1, 2, 3).
Theorem 1.3. Rdeterministic = R if WY |X1,X2,X3 is not symmetrizable. Furthermore, int(Rdeterministic) 6= ∅ only if
WY |X1,X2,X3 is not symmetrizable.
Remark 1.1. We prove the converse part of Theorem 1.3 by showing that if user-k is symmetrizable, then any
achievable rate triple (R1, R2, R3) must be such that Rk = 0. Our capacity region characterization does not cover
the case where some (but not all) users are symmetrizable. In this case, by Theorem 1.1, R restricted to rates of
non-symmetrizable users is clearly an outer bound on Rdeterministic. It is tempting to conjecture that these regions
are equal. A similar conjecture for the two-user AV-MAC was recently proved by Pereg and Steinberg [6].
Clearly, symmetrizability conditions for the two-user AV-MAC with Xi as the state and Xj , Xk as the inputs are
also symmetrizability conditions for our problem (Figures 2 and 3). Thus, for the converse statement, the first two
conditions (4)-(5) follow from Gubner [4]. The third condition (6) is new and arises from the Byzantine nature of
the users in this problem. Consider Figure 4. Here the receiver is unable to tell apart the two possibilities shown,
i.e., whether user 1 is malicious with user 3 sending x3 or user 2 is malicious with user 3 sending x˜3.
The following example shows that the third symmetrizability condition does not imply the others. The channel
below is neither Xj×Xk-symmetrizable by Xi nor Xk|Xj-symmetrizable by Xi for any permutation (i, j, k) of (1, 2, 3).
However, it is X3-symmetrizable by X1/X2.
Example 1.1. Let X1 = X2 = Y = {0, 1}3 and X3 = {0, 1}. We denote x1 = (a1, b1, c1), x2 = (a2, b2, c2), and
y = (y1, y2, y3). Consider the channel WY |X1,X2,X3 defined by
(Y1, Y2) = (C1, C2),
Y3 =
{
B1 ⊕ (A1 ⊙X3) w.p. 1/2
B2 ⊕ (A2 ⊙X3) w.p. 1/2
where ⊙ denotes multiplication and ⊕ denotes addition modulo 2.
To see that this channel is X3-symmetrizable by X1/X2, consider the “deterministic” q((a˜1, b˜1, c˜1)|(a1, b1, c1), x˜3)
and q′((a˜2, b˜2, c˜2)|(a2, b2, c2), x3) defined as follows: let g, g′ : {0, 1}4 → {0, 1}2 be defined as
g((a1, b1, c1), x˜3) = (0, b1 ⊕ (a1 ⊙ x˜3), c1),
g′((a2, b2, c2), x3) = (0, b2 ⊕ (a2 ⊙ x3), c2).
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Mi =
[
ǫ2nRi
3
]
mi
M˜i =
[
2nRi
] Xni
Li
m˜i =Li(mi)
Gi
xni = Gi(Li(mi))
Yn
yn
M˜i
Γ
(k)
i
Λi
valid inner messages for Li
Mi
⊥
(a) Encoder Fi : Li ◦Gi (b) Decoder Φ
(k)
i : Γ
(k)
i ◦ Λi
Figure 5: The encoders and decoders for Theorem 1.1.
Then
q((a˜1, b˜1, c˜1)|(a1, b1, c1), x˜3) = 1(a˜1,b˜1,c˜1)=g((a1,b1,c1),x˜3),
q′((a˜2, b˜2, c˜2)|(a2, b2, c2), x3) = 1(a˜2,b˜2,c˜2)=g′((a2,b2,c2),x3).
Consider the two cases shown in Figure 4 with x1 = (a1, b1, c1), x2 = (a2, b2, c2), and q and q
′ defined as above. It
follows that, in both the cases, the channel output Y has the same conditional distribution given each input. In
particular,
(Y1, Y2) = (c1, c2),
Y3 =
{
b1 ⊕ (a1 ⊙ x˜3) w.p. 1/2
b2 ⊕ (a2 ⊙ x3) w.p. 1/2.
This shows that the symmetrizability condition (6) holds for (i, j, k) = (1, 2, 3).
Since (Y1, Y2) = (C1, C2), it is clear that neither user-1 nor user-2 is symmetrizable. It only remains to show
that the channel is neither X3|X2-symmetrizable by X1 nor X3|X1-symmetrizable by X2. Suppose the channel is
X3|X2-symmetrizable by X1. Then, to satisfy (5) for x2 = (0, 0, c2) and (x3, x˜3) = (0, 1), it is easy to verify that we
must have
q(0, 0, 0|1) + q(0, 0, 1|1) + q(1, 0, 0|1) + q(1, 0, 1|1)
= q(1, 1, 0|0) + q(1, 1, 1|0) + q(0, 0, 0|0) + q(0, 0, 1|0).
However, to satisfy (5) for x2 = (1, 0, c2) and (x3, x˜3) = (0, 1), we can show that we must have
1 + q(0, 0, 0|1) + q(0, 0, 1|1) + q(1, 0, 0|1) + q(1, 0, 1|1)
= q(1, 1, 0|0) + q(1, 1, 1|0) + q(0, 0, 0|0) + q(0, 0, 1|0).
Hence, the channel is not X3|X2-symmetrizable by X1. By symmetry, it is not X3|X1-symmetrizable by X2.
1.3 Proof Sketches
1.3.1 Randomized coding capacity region
Below we sketch the proof of achievability for the strong adversary setting. Full details and a converse proof for the
weak adversary case are available in Appendix A.
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Proof sketch (achievability of Theorem 1.1). Our achievability relies on the following encoder and decoder construc-
tions (Figure 5).
(a) Encoder Fi = Li ◦Gi: First, for each user i, a random injective map Li embeds the given message mi ∈Mi into
the set M˜i whose size is 3/ǫ times that of Mi to obtain the inner message m˜i. Next, the codeword xni ∈ Xni is
generated using a random code Gi drawn for the message set M˜i using an input distribution pi. The encoder maps
Li and Gi are made available to the decoder as the shared secret between user-i and the decoder.
(b) Decoders Φ
(k)
i = Γ
(k)
i ◦ Λi, k 6= i: For each k 6= i, we first use a decoding rule Γ(k)i for a 2-user AV-MAC that is
formed by treating user k’s channel input as the adversarial state. If the reconstructed inner message ˆ˜m
(k)
i = Γ
(k)
i (y
n)
is valid (under the embedding Li), the map Λi outputs message reconstruction mˆ
(k)
i = L
−1
i (
ˆ˜m
(k)
i ). Else, it outputs
a failure, denoted by ⊥.
The achievability follows by showing that, as long as the rate triple (R1, R2, R3) satisfy the constraints (2) and (3)
with U being a constant value – thus, each pair of rates lie in the corresponding AV-MAC capacity region – the
following hold simultaneously: (i) when there is no adversary or when node k is the only adversarial node, mˆi equals
mi w.h.p., and (ii) when a node other that node k is the adversarial node, w.h.p., either mˆi equals mi or the decoder
Φ
(k)
i outputs ⊥. Thus, with high probability, for each non adversarial user i, (i) at least one of the Φ(k)i ’s outputs
the correct message, and (ii) none of the Φ
(k)
i ’s output an incorrect message (though they may output ⊥). Finally,
the achievability of any rate triple satisfying (2) and (3) (i.e., with an arbitrary auxiliary random variable U in the
bounds) follows from a time sharing argument.
1.3.2 Deterministic coding capacity region (Theorem 1.3)
Proof (Converse of Theorem 1.3). Clearly, symmetrizability conditions for the two-user AV-MAC with Xi as the
state alphabet and Xj ,Xk as the input alphabets are also symmetrizability conditions for our problem. Conditions 1
and 2 follow from Gubner [4].
To show condition 3, consider (i, j, k) = (1, 2, 3), the other cases follow similarly. Suppose q(x˜1|x1, x3) and
q′(x˜j |xj , xk) satisfy (6), i.e., ∑
x˜1
q(x˜1|x1, x˜3)WY |X1,X2,X3(y|x˜1, x2, x3)
=
∑
x˜2
q′(x˜2|x2, x3)WY |X1,X2,X3(y|x1, x˜2, x˜3),
∀ x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2, x3, x˜3 ∈ X3, y ∈ Y. (7)
Let m3, m˜3 ∈ M3 be distinct, and let xn3 = f3(m3) and x˜n3 = f3(m˜3). We consider two different settings in which
user-3 sends xn3 and x˜
n
3 respectively:
(i) In the first setting, user-1 is adversarial. It chooses an M1 ∼ Unif(M1). Let Xn1 = f1(M1). To produce
its input X˜n1,m˜3 to the channel, it passes (X
n
1 , x˜
n
3 ) through q
n, the n-fold product of the channel q(x˜1|x1, x3).
User-2, being non-adversarial, sends as its input to the channel Xn2 = f2(M2), where M2 ∼ Unif(M2). User-3
sends xn3 corresponding to message m3. The distribution of the received vector in this case is
1
N1N2
∑
m1,m2
n∏
t=1
∑
x˜1,m˜3,t
q(x˜1,m˜3,t|f1,t(m1), x˜3,t)WY |X1,X2,X3(yt|x˜1,m˜3,t, f2,t(m2), x3,t).
(ii) In the second setting, user-2 is adversarial. It chooses an M2 ∼ Unif(M2). Let Xn2 = f2(M2). To produce
its input X˜n2,m3 to the channel, it passes (X
n
2 , x
n
3 ) through q
′n, the n-fold product of the channel q′(x˜2|x2, x3).
User-1, being non-adversarial now, sends as its input to the channel Xn1 = f1(M1), where M1 ∼ Unif(M1).
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User-3 here sends x˜n3 corresponding to message m˜3. Here, the distribution of the received vector is
1
N1N2
∑
m1,m2
n∏
t=1
∑
x˜2,m3,t
q′(x˜2,m3,t|f2,t(m2), x3,t)WY |X1,X2,X3(yt|f1,t(m1), x˜2,m3,t, x˜3,t).
By (7), the above two distributions are identical. Hence, for any decoder, the sum of probabilities of decoding error
for messages m3 and m˜3 must be at least 1, i.e., if we define e
3
1(m3, x˜
n
1 )
def
= 1N 2
∑
m′2
e1(x˜
n
1 ,m
′
2,m3) and similarly
e32(m˜3, x˜
n
2 )
def
= 1N 1
∑
m′1
e2(m
′
1, x˜
n
2 , m˜3), then
EX˜n1,m˜3
[e31(m3, X˜
n
1,m˜3)] + EX˜n2,m3
[e32(m˜3, X˜
n
2,m3)] =
∑
yn:φ(yn) 6=m3

 1
N1N2
∑
m1,m2
n∏
t=1
∑
x˜1,t
q(x˜1,t|f1,t(m1), x˜3,t)WY |X1,X2,X3(yt|x˜1,t, f2,t(m2), x3,t)


+
∑
yn:φ(yn) 6=m˜3

 1
N1N2
∑
m1,m2
n∏
t=1
∑
x˜2,t
q′(x˜2,t|f2,t(m2), x3,t)WY |X1,X2,X3(yt|f1,t(m1), x˜2,t, x˜3,t)


(a)
≥ 1,
where (a) follows from (7).
Note that the distribution of X˜n1 (resp. X˜
n
2 ) does not depend on m3 (resp. m˜3). Arguing along the lines
of [13, (3.29) in page 187],
2Pe(f1, f2, f3, φ) ≥ Pe,1 + Pe,2
≥ 1
N3
∑
m3
EX˜n1
[e31(m3, X˜
n
1 )] +
1
N3
∑
m3
EX˜n2
[e31(m3, X˜
n
2 )]
for any attack vectors X˜n1 and X˜
n
2 . In particular, for the attack vectors
1
N3
∑
m˜3
X˜1,m˜3 and
1
N3
∑
m3
X˜2,m3 ,
2Pe(f1, f2, f3, φ) ≥ 1
N23
∑
m˜3
∑
m3
(
EX˜n1,m˜3
[e31(m3, X˜
n
1,m˜3)] + EX˜n2,m3
[e32(m˜3, X˜
n
2,m3)]
)
.
For m3 6= m˜3, the term in brackets on the right is upper bounded by 1, otherwise it is upper bounded by zero. Thus,
Pe(f1, f2, f3, φ) ≥ N3(N3 − 1)/2
2N23
≥ 1
8
.
Our achievability proof uses ideas from [13] and is along the lines of the achievability proofs in [5,6]. It is presented
in Appendix C. For a random variable X , let PX denote the set of empirical distributions for blocklength n. For a
distribution PX ∈ PX , let T nX be the set of typical sequences with relative frequencies specified by PX .
Definition 1.4 (Decoder). For η > 0, (m1,m2,m3) ∈ M1 ×M2 ×M3, and encoding maps, f1 : M1 → Xn1 , f2 :
M2 → Xn2 and f3 : M3 → Xn3 , the decoding set Dm1,m2,m3 ⊆ Yn is defined as the intersection of three decoding
sets Dm1 , Dm2 , Dm3 ⊆ Yn defined below.
For m1 ∈ M1, a sequence y ∈ Dm1 if there exists some permutation (j, k) of (2, 3), mj ∈Mj , xk ∈ Xnk , and random
variables X1, Xj , Xk with (f1(m1), fj(mj),xk,y) ∈ T nX1,Xj ,Xk,Y and D(PX1,Xj ,Xk,Y ||PX1×PXj ×PXk×W ) < η such
that the following hold:
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(a) If there exists m′1 ∈ M1, m′1 6= m1, m′j ∈ Mj , m′j 6= mj , x′k ∈ Xnk , and random variables X ′1, X ′j , X ′k such that
(f1(m1), f1(m
′
1), fj(mj), fj(m
′
j),xk,x
′
k,y) ∈ T nX1,X′1,Xj ,X′j ,Xk,X′k,Y and D(PX′1,X′j ,X′k,Y ||PX′1×PX′j×PX′k×W ) <
η, then I(X1, Xj , Y ;X
′
1, X
′
j |Xk) < η.
(b) If there exists m′1 ∈ M1, m′1 6= m1, x′k ∈ Xnk , and random variables X ′1, X ′k such that (f1(m1), f1(m′1), fj(mj),
xk,x
′
k,y) ∈ T nX1,X′1,Xj ,Xk,X′k,Y and D(PX′1,Xj ,X′k,Y ||PX′1 × PXj × PX′k ×W ) < η, then I(X1, Xj , Y ;X
′
1|Xk) < η.
(c) If there exists m′1 ∈ M1, m′1 6= m1, xj ∈ Xnj , mk ∈ Mk, and random variables X ′1, X ′j , X ′k such that
(f1(m1), f1(m
′
1), fj(mj),xj ,xk, fk(mk),y) ∈ T nX1,X′1,Xj ,X′j ,Xk,X′k,Y andD(PX′1,X′j ,X′k,Y ||PX′1×PXj×PX′k×W ) <
η, then I(X1, Xj , Y ;X
′
1, X
′
k|Xk) < η.
The decoding sets Dm2 and Dm3 are defined similarly.
While we decode each user’s message separately, as in joint decoding, the structure of the other users’ codebooks is
made use of. Conditions (a) and (b) above are similar to the decoding conditions in [5]. Condition (c) is associated
with our new non-symmetrizability criterion. It handles the situation in which an adversarial user tries to make
another user appear adversarial while pretending to act honestly.
The following lemma guarantees that the decoder above is well-defined. This is analogous to [13, Lemma 4].
Lemma 1.4 (Disambiguity of decoding). Suppose the channel WY |X1,X2,X3 is not symmetrizable. Let PX1 ∈
PX1 , PX2 ∈ PX2 and PX3 ∈ PX3 be distributions such that for some α > 0,minx1 PX1(x1),minx2 PX2(x2),minx3 PX3 (x3) ≥
α. Let f1 : M1 → T nX1 , f2 : M2 → T nX2 and f3 : M3 → T nX3 be any encoding maps. There exists a choice of η > 0
such that if (m˜1, m˜2, m˜3) 6= (m1,m2,m3), Dm˜1,m˜2,m˜3 ∩Dm1,m2,m3 = ∅.
In Appendix C, we show the existence of codes which when used with the above decoder allow us to achieve all
rates in int(R) whenever the MAC is non-symmetrizable.
A Proof of Theorem 1.1
Proof (Achievability of Theorem 1). For each k = 1, 2, 3, let W (k) be the 2-user AVMAC formed by channel inputs
from node k as the state and the remaining channel inputs as legitimate inputs. Let (R1, R2, R3) be a rate triple
such that, for some p1(x1)p2(x2)p3(x3), the following conditions hold for all permutations (i, j, k) for (1, 2, 3):
Ri ≤ min
q(xk)
I(Xi;Y |Xj), and (8)
Ri +Rj ≤ min
q(xk)
I(Xi, Xj ;Y ), (9)
with the mutual information terms evaluated using the joint distribution pi(xi)pj(xj)q(xk)WY |X1,X2,X3(y|x1, x2, x3).
Let ǫ > 0 be arbitrary and let n be large enough. Note that, by [2], the rate pair (Ri, Rj) is an achievable rate pair
for the AVMAC W (k). For each i ∈ [3], let M˜i = [2nRi ] andMi = [ǫ2nRi/3]. In the following, we show the existence
of a randomized (ǫ2nR1/3, ǫ2nR2/3, ǫ2nR3/3, n) code (F1, F2, F3,Φ) with Pe no larger than ǫ.
Code design Before describing our code, we describe the following maps. First, for each user i, let Li :Mi → M˜i
and Λi : M˜i → Mi be the forward and reverse maps for a uniformly chosen injection from Mi to M˜i. Next, let
Gi : M˜i → Xni be the encoder map for a randomly chosen code whose each letter is drawn independently from the
probability distribution pi. Further, for each k and i 6= k, let Γ(k)i : Yn → M˜i be the reconstruction map for the
message from user i (as described in [2]) when the (randomly drawn) encoder maps (Gi : i ∈ {1, 2, 3} \ {k}) are
used to generate the codewords sent over the AVMAC W (k). Let n be large enough such that the code ((Gi : i ∈
{1, 2, 3} \ {k}), (Γ(k)i : i ∈ {1, 2, 3} \ {k})) has error probability no larger than ǫ/3.
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For each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the encoder map Fi :Mi → Xni is defined as Fi(mi) = Gi(Li(mi)) for every mi ∈ Mi. For
each k ∈ {1, 2, 3} \ {i}, let
Φ
(k)
i (y
n) =
{
Λi(Γ
(k)
i (y
n)) if Γ
(k)
i (y
n) ∈ Li(Mi),
⊥ otherwise.
The decoder Φ : Yn → M1 ×M2 ×M3 outputs Φ(yn) = (mˆ1, mˆ2, mˆ3), where, for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and (j, k) a
permutation of {1, 2, 3} \ {i},
mˆi =


Φ
(j)
i (y
n) if Φ
(j)
i (y
n) = Φ
(k)
i (y
n) 6= ⊥
Φ
(j)
i (y
n) if Φ
(j)
i (y
n) 6= ⊥ and Φ(k)i (yn) = ⊥
Φ
(k)
i (y
n) if Φ
(k)
i (y
n) 6= ⊥ and Φ(j)i (yn) = ⊥
1 otherwise.
Error Analysis We first show that as long as the rate triple (R1, R2, R3) satisfy the constraints (8) and (9) with U
being a constant value – thus, each pair of rates lie in the corresponding AV-MAC capacity region – the following hold
simultaneously for every user i and potentially adversarial user k 6= i: (i) Φ(k)i equals mi w.h.p. if user k is indeed
adversarial and (ii) Φ
(k)
i either equals ⊥ or mi if user k is not adversarial. To this end, consider any permutation
(i, j, k) of (1, 2, 3) and assume that the adversarial user (if any) is user k. Note that the rate pair (Ri, Rj) is an
achievable rate for the AV-MAC W (k).
(i) First, consider Φ
(k)
i . Applying the achievability proof for AV-MACs [2] to the AV-MAC W
(k), with the random
code with encoder mappings Gi and Gj and the decoder mapping (Γ
(k)
i ,Γ
(k)
j ), Γ
(k)
i (Y
n) equals Li(mi) with
probability at least 1− ǫ/3. Thus, with probability at least 1− ǫ/3, Φ(k)i (Y n) equals mi. This holds true both
when k is an adversarial node or a non-adversarial node.
(ii) Next, consider Φ
(j)
i and let X
n
k be the random variable denoting user k’s potentially adversarial channel input.
In this case, Γji (Y
n) may not equal Li(mi) (with a high probability) as the vector transmitted from node k may
not be a valid codeword from the codebook for Fk. Let PFi,Mi,Fj ,Xnk ,Y n be the joint probability distribution of
the quintuplet (Fi,Mi, Fj , X
n
k , Y
n) when Xnk is generated according to a possibly adversarial distribution PXnk ,
Fi and Fj are generated according to our random code constructions, Mi and Mj are uniformly chosen from
Mi and Mj respectively, and Y n is the channel output random variable when the channel inputs are Fi(Mi),
Fj(Mj), and X
n
k . Further, let Li, Gi, and Γ
(j)
i be the random variables denoting the maps described in our
code design (such that Fi = Li ◦ Gi). In the following chain of inequalities, we let fi, li, gi, γ(j)i , mi, fj , xnk ,
and yn denote instantiations of the random variables Fi, Li, Gi, Γ
(j)
i , Mi, Fj , X
n
k , and Y
n respectively. We
have,
PFi,Mi,Fj ,Mj ,Xnk ,Y
n(Φ
(j)
i (Y
n) /∈ {Mi,⊥})
= PFi,Mi,Fj ,Mj ,Xnk ,Y n(Γ
(j)
i (Y
n) ∈ Li(Mi) \ {Li(Mi)})
=
∑
li,gi,mi,fj ,mj,x
n
k
yn:γ
(j)
i (y
n)∈li(Mi)\{li(mi)}
PLi(li)PGi(gi)PMi(mi)PFj (fj)PMj (mj)PXnk (x
n
k )WY n|Xni ,Xnj ,Xnk (y
n|fi(mi), fj(mj), xnk )
=
∑
gi,mi,fj ,mj ,xnk ,y
n
PGi(gi)PMi(mi)PFj (fj)PMj (mj)PXnk (x
n
k )
×
∑
li
PLi(li)WY n|Xni ,Xnj ,Xnk (y
n|gi(li(mi)), fj(mj), xnk )1{γ(j)i (yn)∈li(Mi)\{li(mi)}
}
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=
∑
gi,mi,fj ,mj ,xnk ,y
n
PGi(gi)PMi(mi)PFj (fj)PMj (mj)PXnk (x
n
k )
×
∑
li
∑
m˜i∈M˜i
∑
m˜′i∈M˜i
PLi(li)1{li(mi)=m˜i}WY n|Xni ,Xnj ,Xnk (y
n|gi(m˜i), fj(mj), xnk )1{γ(j)i (yn)=m˜′i
}1{m˜′i∈li(Mi)\{m˜i}}
=
∑
gi,mi,fj ,mj ,xnk ,y
n
PGi(gi)PMi(mi)PFj (fj)PMj (mj)PXnk (x
n
k )
×
∑
m˜i∈M˜i
∑
m˜′i∈M˜i
WY n|Xni ,Xnj ,Xnk (y
n|gi(m˜i), fj(mj), xnk )1{γ(j)i (yn)=m˜′i
}
∑
li
PLi(li)1{li(mi)=m˜i}1{m˜′i∈li(Mi)\{m˜i}}
=
∑
gi,mi,fj ,mj ,xnk ,y
n
PGi(gi)PMi(mi)PFj (fj)PMj (mj)PXnk (x
n
k )
×
∑
m˜i∈M˜i
∑
m˜′i∈M˜i
WY n|Xni ,Xnj ,Xnk (y
n|gi(m˜i), fj(mj), xnk )1{γ(j)i (yn)=m˜′i
}PLi(Li(mi) = m˜i, m˜
′
i ∈ Li(Mi \ {mi}))
=
∑
gi,mi,fj ,mj ,xnk ,y
n
PGi(gi)PMi(mi)PFj (fj)PMj (mj)PXnk (x
n
k )
×
∑
m˜i∈M˜i
∑
m˜′i∈M˜i
WY n|Xni ,Xnj ,Xnk (y
n|gi(m˜i), fj(mj), xnk )1{γ(j)i (yn)=m˜′i
} 1
|M˜i|
|Mi| − 1
|M˜i| − 1
=
∑
m˜i∈M˜i
1
|M˜i|
|Mi| − 1
|M˜i| − 1
≤ |Mi||M˜i|
= ǫ/3.
Thus, with high probability, for each non-adversarial user i, at least one of the decoders Φ
(j)
i or Φ
(k)
i outputs
the true message while the other decoder outputs either the true message or ⊥.
Proof (Converse of Theorem 1.1). We show converse for the weak adversary. Suppose (F1, F2, F3,Φ) is a (2
nR1 , 2nR2 , 2nR3 , n)
randomized code such that Pe ≤ ǫ for some ǫ > 0. Recall that F1, F2, F3 are independent. Let Mi ∼ Unif(Mi),
i = 1, 2, 3 be independent. Let Mˆi = Ψi(Y
n, F1, F2, F3), i = 1, 2, 3. Then, ǫ is an upperbound on (1) which is given
by
Pweake,1 = max
xn1
PF2,F3,Φ
(
(Mˆ2, Mˆ3) 6= (M2,M3)
∣∣∣Xn1 = xn1 , Xn2 = F2(M2), Xn3 = F3(M3))
= max
pXn
1
PF2,F3,Φ
(
(Mˆ2, Mˆ3) 6= (M2,M3)
∣∣∣Xn2 = F2(M2), Xn3 = F3(M3)).
We consider the following pXn1 .
pXn1 (x
n
1 ) =
n∏
i=1
qX1,i(x1,i).
By Fano’s inequality, under this pXn1 and when X
n
i = Fi(Wi), i = 2, 3,
H(M2,M3|Y n,Φ) ≤ 1 + nǫ(R2 +R3).
Ignoring small terms, we have
n(R2 +R3) ≤ H(M2,M3)
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≤ H(M2,M3|Φ, F2, F3)
(a)≈ I(M2,M3;Y n|Φ, F2, F3)
=
n∑
i=1
I(M2,M3;Yi|Y i−1,Φ, F2, F3)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(M2,M3,Φ, F2, F3, Y
i−1;Yi)
=
n∑
i=1
I(M2,M3,Φ, F2, F3, Y
i−1, X2,i, X3,i;Yi)
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
I(X2,i, X3,i;Yi),
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality (ignoring an O(nǫ) term), (b) follows from the memorylessness of the channel
and the independence of X1,i over i = 1, . . . , n for the particular pXn1 under consideration.
Let U ∼ Unif{1, 2, . . . , n} independent of (M1,M2,M3, F1, F2, F3,Φ, Y n). We have (where we ignore an additive
O(ǫ) term)
R2 +R3 ≤ I(X2,U , X3,U ;YU |U).
Since, the above bound holds for all pXn1 (x
n
1 ) =
∏n
i=1 qXi,i (x1,i), and noticing that conditioned on X1,U , X2,U , X3,U
the channel law WY |X1,X2,X3 gives the conditional probability of YU , we may write
R2 +R3 ≤ min
q(x1|u)
I(X2, X3;Y |U). (10)
We note that the distribution of U,X1, X2, X3, Y is p(u)q(x1|u)p(x2|u)p(x3|u)WY |X1,X2,X3(y|x1, x2, x3) where p(x2|u)
is determined by the distribution of F2 and p(x3|u) is determined by the distribution of F3.
Proceeding similarly, for pXn1 (x
n
1 ) =
∏n
i=1 qX1,i(x1,i),
nR2 ≤ H(M2)
≤ H(M2|M3,Φ, F2, F3)
≈ I(M2;Y n|M3,Φ, F2, F3)
=
n∑
i=1
I(M2;Yi|Y i−1,M3,Φ, F2, F3)
=
n∑
i=1
I(M2, X2,i;Yi|X3,i, Y i−1,M3,Φ, F2, F3)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(X2,i, Y
i−1,M2,M3,Φ, F2, F3;Yi|X3,i)
=
n∑
i=1
I(X2,i;Yi|X3,i).
Hence, we have
R2 ≤ min
q(x1|u)
I(X2;Y |X3, U), (11)
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where the joint distribution of the random variables is p(u)q(x1|u)p(x2|u)p(x3|u)WY |X1,X2,X3(y|x1, x2, x3). We note
that p(u)p(x2|u)p(x3|u) are the same as in (10). Similarly,
R3 ≤ min
q(x1|u)
I(X3;Y |X2, U). (12)
Similarly, considering Pweake,2 with pXn2 (x
n
2 ) =
∏n
i=1 qX2,i (x2,i) (and X
n
i = Fi(Wi), i = 1, 3), we get
R3 ≤ min
q(x2|u)
I(X3;Y |X1, U), (13)
R1 ≤ min
q(x2|u)
I(X1;Y |X3, U), (14)
R3 +R1 ≤ min
q(x2|u)
I(X3, X1;Y |U), (15)
where the joint distribution of the random variables is p(u)p(x1|u)q(x2|u)p(x3|u)WY |X1,X2,X3(y|x1, x2, x3). We note
that p(u) and p(x3|u) here is the same as in (10)-(12). Considering Pweake,3 with pXn3 (xn3 ) =
∏n
i=1 qX3,i(x3,i) (and
Xni = Fi(Wi), i = 1, 2), we similarly arrive at
R1 ≤ min
q(x3|u)
I(X1;Y |X3, U), (16)
R2 ≤ min
q(x3|u)
I(X2;Y |X2, U), (17)
R1 +R2 ≤ min
q(x3|u)
I(X1, X2;Y |U), (18)
where the joint distribution of the random variables is p(u)p(x1|u)p(x2|u)q(x3|u)WY |X1,X2,X3(y|x1, x2, x3). The p(u),
p(x1|u), and p(x2|u) are the same as in (10)-(18). By Caratheodory’s theorem, it is enough to choose U such that
|U| ≤ 3. This completes the proof of converse.
B Proof of Theorem 1.2
Proof of Theorem 1.2. We argue that under the given condition,
Rweakrandom = Rdeterministic.
The proof is similar to that of the corresponding result [2, Theorem 1] for AVMAC. Jahn uses an extension of
Ahlswede’s elimination technique to reduce the randomness of each encoder (shared with the decoder) to take only n2
values. A further extension to three users in a similar manner leads to the same result for our setup under the week
adversary model - the rate-triples in Rweakrandom can be achieved by codes where each encoder randomness is limited to
take only n2 values. A deterministic code for any rate triple in Rweakrandom can then be constructed as the concatenation
of two codes. A o(n)-length deterministic code with n2 codewords can be used to communicate 2 log2 n bits out of
each message. An arbitrarily small rate is required for this code. Then a randomized code, which uses the 2 log2 n
bits messages of the deterministic code as encoder randomness’, can be used to transmit the rest of the message
bits.
C Proof of Theorem 1.3
For a random variable X , let PX denote the set of empirical distributions for blocklength n. For a distribution
PX ∈ PX , let T nX be the set of typical sequences with relative frequencies specified by PX .
Lemma 1.5. For any ǫ > 0, n ≥ n0(ǫ), N1, N2, N3 ≥ exp(nǫ) and types P1, P2, P3 over X1,X2,X3 respectively, there
exists codebooks {x11, . . . ,x1N1 ∈ Xn1 } , {x21, . . . ,x2N2 ∈ Xn2 } and {x31, . . . ,x3N3 ∈ Xn3 } each of type P1, P2 and P3
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respectively such that for every permutation (i, j, k) of (1, 2, 3), for every (xi,xj ,xk) ∈ Xni ×Xnj ×Xnk , for every joint
type PXi,X′i,Xj ,X′j ,Xk,X′k and for Ri
def
= (1/n) log2Ni, Rj
def
= (1/n) log2Nj and Rk
def
= (1/n) log2Nk, the following holds.
1
NiNj
|{(r, s) : (xir ,xjs) ∈ T nXi,Xj}| ≤ exp (−nǫ) if I(Xi;Xj) > ǫ, (19)
1
NiNj
|{(r, s) : (xir ,xjs,xk) ∈ T nXi,Xj ,Xk}| ≤ exp (−nǫ/2) if I(Xi, Xj ;Xk) > ǫ, (20)
|{u : (xi,xiu,xj ,xk) ∈ T nXi,X′i ,Xj ,Xk}| ≤ exp
{
n
(|Ri − I(X ′i;Xi, Xj , Xk)|+ + ǫ)} , (21)
|{u, v : (xi,xiu,xj ,xjv,xk) ∈ T nXi,X′i ,Xj ,X′j ,Xk}| ≤ exp
{
n
(|Ri +Rj − I(X ′i, X ′j ;Xi, Xj , Xk)|+ + ǫ)} , (22)
1
NiNj
|{(r, s) : (xir ,xiu,xjs,xk) ∈ T nXi,X′i,Xj ,Xk for some u 6= r}| ≤ exp (−nǫ/2)
if I(Xi, Xj ;X
′
i, Xk)− |Ri − I(X ′i;Xk)|+ > ǫ, (23)
1
NiNj
|{(r, s) : (xir ,xiu,xjs,xk,xkt ∈ T nXi,X′i,Xj ,Xk,X′k for some u 6= r and some t ∈ [1 : Nk]}| ≤ exp (−nǫ/2)
if I(Xi, Xj ;X
′
i, X
′
k, Xk)− |Ri +Rk − I(X ′i, X ′k;Xk)|+ > ǫ, and (24)
1
NiNj
|{(r, s) : (xir ,xiu,xjs,xjv,xk) ∈ T nXi,X′i,Xj ,X′j ,Xk for some u 6= r and v 6= s}| ≤ exp (−nǫ/2)
if I(Xi, Xj ;X
′
i, X
′
j , Xk)− |Ri + Rj − I(X ′i, X ′j ;Xk)|+ > ǫ. (25)
Proof sketch. For each i = 1, 2, 3, we draw Ni codewords independently and uniformly at random from the type
class Pi. The inequalities follow by first using standard counting arguments based on types to calculate the expected
number of codewords lying in the sets specified by (19)- (25) and then applying concentration inequalities to bound
probability that the actual number of codewords deviates from the expectation. We skip the details here as the proof
follows similarly to [13, Lemma 3].
We recall the definition of the decoder.
Definition (Decoder). For η > 0, (m1,m2,m3) ∈ M1×M2×M3, and encoding maps, f1 :M1 → Xn1 , f2 :M2 →
Xn2 and f3 : M3 → Xn3 , the decoding set Dm1,m2,m3 ⊆ Yn is defined as the intersection of three decoding sets
Dm1 , Dm2 , Dm3 ⊆ Yn defined below.
For m1 ∈ M1, a sequence y ∈ Dm1 if there exists some permutation (j, k) of (2, 3), mj ∈Mj , xk ∈ Xnk , and random
variables X1, Xj , Xk with (f1(m1), fj(mj),xk,y) ∈ T nX1,Xj ,Xk,Y and D(PX1,Xj ,Xk,Y ||PX1×PXj ×PXk×W ) < η such
that the following hold:
(a) If there exists m′1 ∈ M1, m′1 6= m1, m′j ∈ Mj , m′j 6= mj , x′k ∈ Xnk , and random variables X ′1, X ′j , X ′k such that
(f1(m1), f1(m
′
1), fj(mj), fj(m
′
j),xk,x
′
k,y) ∈ T nX1,X′1,Xj ,X′j ,Xk,X′k,Y and D(PX′1,X′j ,X′k,Y ||PX′1×PX′j×PX′k×W ) <
η, then I(X1, Xj , Y ;X
′
1, X
′
j |Xk) < η.
(b) If there exists m′1 ∈ M1, m′1 6= m1, x′k ∈ Xnk , and random variables X ′1, X ′k such that (f1(m1), f1(m′1), fj(mj),
xk,x
′
k,y) ∈ T nX1,X′1,Xj ,Xk,X′k,Y and D(PX′1,Xj ,X′k,Y ||PX′1 × PXj × PX′k ×W ) < η, then I(X1, Xj , Y ;X
′
1|Xk) < η.
(c) If there exists m′1 ∈ M1, m′1 6= m1, xj ∈ Xnj , mk ∈ Mk, and random variables X ′1, X ′j , X ′k such that
(f1(m1), f1(m
′
1), fj(mj),xj ,xk, fk(mk),y) ∈ T nX1,X′1,Xj ,X′j ,Xk,X′k,Y andD(PX′1,X′j ,X′k,Y ||PX′1×PXj×PX′k×W ) <
η, then I(X1, Xj , Y ;X
′
1, X
′
k|Xk) < η.
The decoding sets Dm2 and Dm3 are defined similarly.
The following Lemma implies that the decoder above is well defined.
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Lemma 1.4. Suppose the channel WY |X1,X2,X3 is not symmetrizable. Let PX1 ∈ PX1 , PX2 ∈ PX2 and PX3 ∈ PX3
be distributions such that for some α > 0, minx1 PX1(x1),minx2 PX2(x2),minx3 PX3(x3) ≥ α. Let f1 : M1 →
T nX1 , f2 : M2 → T nX2 and f3 : M3 → T nX3 be any encoding maps. There exists a choice of η > 0 such that if
(m˜1, m˜2, m˜3) 6= (m1,m2,m3), Dm˜1,m˜2,m˜3 ∩Dm1,m2,m3 = ∅.
Proof. To prove the lemma, it is sufficient to show that the decoding regions of the decoders for each user are disjoint.
Let us consider the decoder for user 1. Suppose y ∈ Yn is such that y lies in the decoding regions, Dm1 , Dm˜1 of
m1, m˜1 ∈ M1 where m˜1 6= m1. Then there exist permutations (i, j) and (˜i, j˜) of (2, 3) such that one of the following
cases holds.
Case 1: (˜i, j˜) = (i, j)
There exist mj , m˜j ∈ Mj, sequences xi, x˜i ∈ Xni , and random variables X1, X˜1, Xj, X˜j , Xi, X˜i with (f1(m1), f1(m˜1),
fj(mj), fj(m˜j),xi, x˜i) ∈ T nX1X˜1XjX˜jXiX˜i such that D(PX1XjXiY ||PX1 ×PXj ×PXi ×W ), D(PX˜1X˜jX˜iY ||PX˜1 ×PX˜j ×
PX˜i ×W ) < η and
Case 1(a) if m˜j 6= mj , then I(X1XjY ; X˜1X˜j|Xi), I(X˜1X˜jY ;X1Xj|X˜i) < η.
Case 1(b) if m˜j = mj , then X˜j = Xj and I(X1XjY ; X˜1|Xi), I(X˜1XjY ;X1|X˜i) < η.
Case 2: (˜i, j˜) = (j, i)
There exist mj ∈ Mj, m˜i ∈ Mi, sequences x˜j ∈ Xnj , xi ∈ Xni and random variables X1, X˜1, Xj , X˜j , Xi, X˜i
with (f1(m1), f1(m˜1), fj(mj), x˜j , xi, fi(m˜i)) ∈ T nX1X˜1XjX˜jXiX˜i such that D(PX1XjXiY ||PX1 × PXj × PXi ×W ),
D(PX˜1X˜jX˜iY ||PX˜1 × PX˜j × PX˜i ×W ) < η and I(X1XjY ; X˜1X˜i|Xi),I(X˜1X˜iY ;X1Xj|X˜j) < η.
We first analyze Case 1(a). Let WY |X1XjXi be denoted by W .
D(PX1XjXiY ||PX1 × PXj × PXi ×W ) +D(PX˜1,X˜j ||PX˜1 × PX˜j ) + I(X1XjY ; X˜1X˜j |Xi)
(a)
=
∑
x1,xj,xi,y
PX1XjXiY (x1, xj , xi, y) log
PX1XjXiY (x1, xj , xi, y)
PX1(x1)PXj (xj)PXi (xi)W (y|x1, xj , xi)
+
∑
x˜1,x˜j
PX˜1X˜j (x˜1, x˜j) log
PX˜1X˜j (x˜1, x˜j)
PX˜1(x˜1)PX˜j (x˜j)
+
∑
x1,x˜1,xj ,x˜j,xi,y
PX1X˜1XjX˜jXiY (x1, x˜1, xj , x˜j , xi, y) log
PX1X˜1XjX˜jY |Xi(x1, x˜1, xj , x˜j , y|xi)
PX1XjY |Xi(x1, xj , y|xi)PX˜1X˜j |Xi(x˜1, x˜j |xi)
=
∑
x1,x˜1,xj,x˜j,xi,y
PX1X˜1XjX˜jXiY (x1, x˜1, xj , x˜j , xi, y) log
PX1X˜1XjX˜jXiY (x1, x˜1, xj , x˜j , xi, y)
PX1 (x1)PX˜1(x˜1)PXj (xj)PX˜j (x˜j)PXi|X˜1X˜j (xi|x˜1, x˜j)W (y|x1, xj , xi)
= D(PX1X˜1XjX˜jXiY ||PX1PX˜1PXjPX˜jPXi|X˜1X˜jW )
(b)
≥ D(PX1X˜1XjX˜jY ||PX1PX˜1PXjPX˜j V˜1) where V˜1(y|x1, x˜1, xj , x˜j) =
∑
xi
PXi|X˜1X˜j (xi|x˜1, x˜j)W (y|x1, xj , xi),
where (b) follows from the log sum inequality. From the given conditions, we know that the term on the LHS of (a)
is no greater than 3η. Thus, D(PX1X˜1XjX˜jY ||PX1PX˜1PXjPX˜j V˜1) ≤ 3η. Using Pinsker’s inequality, it follows that∑
x1,x˜1,xj ,x˜j,y
∣∣∣PX1X˜1XjX˜jY (x1, x˜1, xj , x˜j , y)− PX1(x1)PX˜1 (x˜1)PXj (xj)PX˜j (x˜j)V˜1(y|x1, x˜1, xj , x˜j)
∣∣∣ ≤ c√3η, (26)
where c is some positive constant. Following a similar line of argument, we can show that
3η ≥ D(PX˜1X˜jX˜iY ||PX˜1 × PX˜j × PX˜i ×W ) +D(PX1Xj ||PX1 × PXj ) + I(X˜1X˜jY ;X1Xj|X˜i)
≥ D(PX1X˜1XjX˜jY ||PX1PX˜1PXjPX˜jV1) where V1(y|x1, x˜1, xj , x˜j) =
∑
x˜i
PX˜i|X1Xj (x˜i|x1, xj)W (y|x˜1, x˜j , x˜i)
18
Using Pinsker’s inequality, it follows that∑
x1,x˜1,xj ,x˜j,y
∣∣∣PX1X˜1XjX˜jY (x1, x˜1, xj , x˜j , y)− PX1(x1)PX˜1 (x˜1)PXj (xj)PX˜j (x˜j)V1(y|x1, x˜1, xj , x˜j)
∣∣∣ ≤ c√3η. (27)
From (26) and (27),
∑
x1,x˜1,xj,x˜j ,y
PX1(x1)PX˜1 (x˜1)PXj (xj)PX˜j (x˜j)
∣∣∣V˜1(y|x1, x˜1, xj , x˜j)− V1(y|x1, x˜1, xj , x˜j)∣∣∣ ≤ 2c√3η.
This implies that
max
x1,x˜1,xj,x˜j,y
∣∣∣V˜1(y|x1, x˜1, xj , x˜j)− V1(y|x1, x˜1, xj , x˜j)∣∣∣ ≤ 2c
√
3η
α4
. (28)
Similar to [5, (A.15) on page 748], since WY |X1,X2,X3 is not X1 ×Xj-symmetrizable by Xi (i.e., (4) does not hold for
(i, j, k) = (i, j, 1)), we can show that for any pair of channels PX˜i|X1Xj and PXi|X˜1X˜j , there exists ζ1 > 0 such that
max
x1,x˜1,xj,x˜j ,y
∣∣∣V˜1(y|x1, x˜1, xj , x˜j)− V1(y|x1, x˜1, xj , x˜j)∣∣∣ ≥ ζ1.
This contradicts (28) if η <
ζ21α
8
12c2 .
We now analyze Case 1(b).
D(PX1XjXiY ||PX1 × PXj × PXi ×W ) + I(X1XjY ; X˜1|Xi)
(a)
=∑
x1,xj,xi,y
PX1XjXiY (x1, xj , xi, y) log
PX1XjXiY (x1, xj , xi, y)
PX1(x1)PXj (xj)PXi(xi)W (y|x1, xj , xi)
+
∑
x1,x˜1,xj,xi,y
PX1X˜1XjXiY (x1, x˜1, xj , xi, y) log
PX1X˜1XjY |Xi(x1, x˜1, xj , y|xi)
PX1XjY |Xi(x1, xj , y|xi)PX˜1|Xi(x˜1|xi)
=
∑
x1,x˜1,xj ,xi,y
PX1X˜1XjXiY (x1, x˜1, xj , xi, y) log
PX1X˜1XjXiY (x1, x˜1, xj , xi, y)
PX1(x1)PX˜1 (x˜1)PXj (xj)PXi|X˜1(xi|x˜1)W (y|x1, xj , xi)
= D(PX1X˜1XjXiY ||PX1PX˜1PXjPXi|X˜1W )
(b)
≥ D(PX1X˜1XjY ||PX1PX˜1PXj V˜2) where V˜2(y|x1, x˜1, xj) =
∑
xi
PXi|X˜1(xi|x˜1)W (y|x1, xj , xi),
where (b) follows from the log sum inequality. From the given conditions, we know that the term on the LHS of (a)
is no greater than 2η. Thus, D(PX1X˜1XjY ||PX1PX˜1PXj V˜2) ≤ 2η. Using Pinsker’s inequality, it follows that∑
x1,x˜1,xj ,y
∣∣∣PX1X˜1XjY (x1, x˜1, xj , y)− PX1(x1)PX˜1 (x˜1)PXj (xj)V˜2(y|x1, x˜1, xj)
∣∣∣ ≤ c√2η, (29)
where c is some positive constant. Following a similar line of argument, we can show that
2η ≥ D(PX˜1XjX˜iY ||PX˜1 × PXj × PX˜i ×W ) + I(X˜1XjY ;X1|X˜i)
≥ D(PX1X˜1XjY ||PX1PX˜1PXjV2) where V2(y|x1, x˜1, xj) =
∑
x˜i
PX˜i|X1(x˜i|x1)W (y|x˜1, xj , x˜i).
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Using Pinsker’s inequality, it follows that∑
x1,x˜1,xj ,y
∣∣∣PX1X˜1XjY (x1, x˜1, xj , y)− PX1(x1)PX˜1 (x˜1)PXj (xj)V2(y|x1, x˜1, xj)
∣∣∣ ≤ c√3η. (30)
From (29) and (30),
∑
x1,x˜1,xj,y
PX1 (x1)PX˜1(x˜1)PXj (xj)
∣∣∣V˜2(y|x1, x˜1, xj)− V2(y|x1, x˜1, xj)∣∣∣ ≤ 2c√3η.
This implies that
max
x1,x˜1,xj,y
∣∣∣V˜2(y|x1, x˜1, xj)− V2(y|x1, x˜1, xj)∣∣∣ ≤ 2c
√
2η
α4
. (31)
Similar to [5, (A.5) on page 747], since WY |X1,X2,X3 is not X1|Xj-symmetrizable by Xi (i.e., (5) does not hold for
(i, j, k) = (i, j, 1)), we can show that for any pair for channels PX˜i|X1 and PXi|X˜1 , there exists ζ2 > 0 such that
max
x1,x˜1,xj ,y
∣∣∣V˜2(y|x1, x˜1, xj)− V2(y|x1, x˜1, xj)∣∣∣ ≥ ζ2.
This contradicts (31) if η <
ζ22α
8
8c2 .
We now analyse Case 2.
D(PX1XjXiY ||PX1 × PXj × PXi ×W ) +D(PX˜1,X˜i ||PX˜1 × PX˜i) + I(X1XjY ; X˜1X˜i|Xi)
(a)
=∑
x1,xj,xi,y
PX1XjXiY (x1, xj , xi, y) log
PX1XjXiY (x1, xj , xi, y)
PX1(x1)PXj (xj)PXi (xi)W (y|x1, xj , xi)
+
∑
x˜1,x˜i
PX˜1X˜i(x˜1, x˜i) log
PX˜1X˜i(x˜1, x˜i)
PX˜1(x˜1)PX˜i (x˜i)
+
∑
x1,x˜1,xj ,xi,x˜i,y
PX1X˜1XjXiX˜iY (x1, x˜1, xj , xi, x˜i, y) log
PX1X˜1XjX˜iY |Xi(x1, x˜1, xj , x˜i, y|xi)
PX˜1X˜i|Xi(x˜1, x˜i|xi)PX1XjY |Xi(x1, xj , y|xi)
=
∑
x1,x˜1,xj,xi,x˜i,y
PX1X˜1XjXiX˜iY (x1, x˜1, xj , xi, x˜i, y) log
PX1X˜1XjXiX˜iY (x1, x˜1, xj , xi, x˜i, y)
PX1(x1)PX˜1(x˜1)PXj (xj)PX˜i (x˜i)PXi|X˜1X˜i(xi|x˜1, x˜i)W (y|x1, xj , xi)
= D(PX1X˜1XjXiX˜iY ||PX1PX˜1PXjPX˜iPXi|X˜1X˜iW )
(b)
≥ D(PX1X˜1XjX˜iY ||PX1PX˜1PXjPX˜i V˜3) where V˜3(y|x1, x˜1, xj , x˜i) =
∑
xi
PXi|X˜1X˜i(xi|x˜1, x˜i)W (y|x1, xj , xi),
where (b) follows from the log sum inequality. From the given conditions, we know that the term on the LHS of (a)
is no greater than 3η. Thus, D(PX1X˜1XjX˜iY ||PX1PX˜1PXjPX˜i V˜3) ≤ 3η. Using Pinsker’s inequality, it follows that∑
x1,x˜1,xj,x˜i,y
∣∣∣PX1X˜1XjX˜iY (x1, x˜1, xj , x˜i, y)− PX1(x1)PX˜1 (x˜1)PXj (xj)PX˜i(x˜i)V˜3(y|x1, x˜1, xj , x˜i)
∣∣∣ ≤ c√3η (32)
for some constant c > 0. Following a similar line of argument,
D(PX˜1X˜jX˜iY ||PX˜1 × PX˜j × PX˜i ×W ) +D(PX1Xj ||PX1 × PXj ) + I(X˜1X˜iY ;X1Xj |X˜j)
(a)
=
∑
x˜1,x˜j,x˜i,y
PX˜1X˜jX˜iY (x˜1, x˜j , x˜i, y) log
PX˜1X˜jX˜iY (x˜1, x˜j , x˜i, y)
PX˜1(x˜1)PX˜j (x˜j)PX˜i (x˜i)W (y|x˜1, x˜j , x˜i)
+
∑
x1,xj
PX1Xj (x1, xj) log
PX1Xj (x1, xj)
PX1(x1)PXj (xj)
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+
∑
x1,x˜1,xj ,x˜j,x˜i,y
PX1X˜1XjX˜jX˜iY (x1, x˜1, xj , x˜j , x˜i, y) log
PX1X˜1XjX˜iY |X˜j (x1, x˜1, xj , x˜i, y|x˜j)
PX˜1X˜iY |X˜j (x˜1, x˜i, y|x˜j)PX1Xj |X˜j (x1, xj |x˜j)
=
∑
x1,x˜1,xj,x˜j,x˜i,y
PX1X˜1XjX˜jX˜iY (x1, x˜1, xj , x˜j , x˜i, y) log
PX1X˜1XjX˜jX˜iY (x1, x˜1, xj , x˜j , x˜i, y)
PX1 (x1)PX˜1(x˜1)PXj (xj)PX˜i (x˜i)PX˜j |X1Xj (x˜j |x1, xj)W (y|x˜1, x˜j , x˜i)
= D(PX1X˜1XjX˜jX˜iY ||PX1PX˜1PXjPX˜jPX˜j |X1XjW )
≥ D(PX1X˜1XjX˜iY ||PX1PX˜1PXjPX˜iV3) where V3(y|x1, x˜1, xj , x˜i) =
∑
x˜j
PX˜j |X1Xj (x˜j |x1, xj)W (y|x˜1, x˜j , x˜i).
From the given conditions, the term on the left of (a) is no larger than 3η. Thus,D(PX1X˜1XjX˜iY ||PX1PX˜1PXjPX˜iV3) ≤
3η.
Using Pinsker’s inequality, it follows that∑
x1,x˜1,xj ,x˜i,y
∣∣∣PX1X˜1XjX˜iY (x1, x˜1, xj , x˜i, y)− PX1 (x1)PX˜1(x˜1)PXj (xj)PX˜i (x˜i)V3(y|x1, x˜1, xj , x˜i)
∣∣∣ ≤ c√3η. (33)
From (32) and (33),
∑
x1,x˜1,xj ,x˜j,y
PX1(x1)PX˜1(x˜1)PXj (xj)PX˜i (x˜i)
∣∣∣V˜3(y|x1, x˜1, xj , x˜i)− V3(y|x1, x˜1, xj , x˜i)∣∣∣ ≤ 2c√3η. (34)
This implies that
max
x1,x˜1,xj,x˜j ,y
∣∣∣V˜3(y|x1, x˜1, xj , x˜i)− V3(y|x1, x˜1, xj , x˜i)∣∣∣ ≤ 2c
√
3η
α4
. (35)
Since WY |X1,X2,X3 is not X1-symmetrizable by Xj/Xi (i.e., (6) does not hold for (i, j, k) = (i, j, 1)), for any pair of
channels PXi|X˜1X˜i and PX˜j˜ |X1Xj
, there exists ζ3 > 0, such that
max
x1,x˜1,xj ,x˜j,y
∣∣∣V˜3(y|x1, x˜1, xj , x˜i)− V3(y|x1, x˜1, xj , x˜i)∣∣∣ ≥ ζ3.
This contradicts (35) if η <
ζ23α
8
12c2 . Let ζ
def
= min {ζ1, ζ2, ζ3}, any η satisfying 0 < η < ζ
2α8
12c2 ensures disjoint decoding
regions.
Proof (Achievability of Theorem 1.3). Our achievability proof uses ideas from [13] and is along the lines of the achiev-
ability proofs in [5, 6]. Fix distributions P1 ∈ PX1 , P2 ∈ PX2 and P3 ∈ PX3 . For these distributions, consider the
codebook given by Lemma 1.5 and the decoder given by Definition 1.4 for some 0 < η < ζ
2α8
12c2 , which will be specified
later. For this code, the analysis of probability of error is as below. Assume user 3 is adversarial. For y ∈ Yn, let
φ(y) = (ψ1(y), ψ2(y), ψ3(y)). Then, the probability of error as defined earlier is given by
Pe,3
def
= max
x3
1
N1N2
∑
r∈M1,s∈M2
P
(
(ψ1(y), ψ2(y)) 6= (r, s)
∣∣∣Xn1 = x1r, Xn2 = x2s, Xn3 = x3).
Using union bound, we can upper bound Pe,3 as follows.
Pe,3 ≤ max
x3

 1N1N2
∑
r∈M1,s∈M2
P
(
ψ1(y) 6= r
∣∣∣Xn1 = x1r, Xn2 = x2s, Xn3 = x3)
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+
1
N1N2
∑
r∈M1,s∈M2
P
(
ψ2(y) 6= s
∣∣∣Xn1 = x1r, Xn2 = x2s, Xn3 = x3)

 . (36)
For a fixed sequence x3 ∈ Xn3 and a received vector y ∈ Yn, Let
Q def= {PX1X2X3Y : I(X1;X2) ≤ ǫ, I(X1X2;X3) ≤ ǫ,D(PX1X2X3Y ||PX1PX2PX3W ) ≥ η},
A
def
= {(r, s) : (x1r ,x2s) ∈ ∪PX1 ,X2 :I(X1;X2)>ǫ T nX1X2},
B
def
= {(r, s) : (x1r ,x2s,x3) ∈ ∪PX1X2X3 :I(X1X2;X3)>ǫ T nX1X2},
C
def
= {(r, s) : (x1r ,x2s,x3,y) ∈ ∪PX1X2X3Y ∈Q T nX1X2X3Y },
D
def
= {(r, s) : (x1r ,x2s,x3,y) ∈ ∪PX1X2X3Y :D(PX1X2X3Y ||PX1PX2PX3W )<η T nX1X2X3Y and ψ1(y) 6= r}.
We obtain an upper bound on the the first term of (36) in the braces in terms of these sets.
1
N1N2
∑
r,s
P
(
ψ1(y) 6= r
∣∣Xn1 = x1r, Xn2 = x2s, Xn3 = x3) ≤ |A|N1N2 +
|B|
N1N2
+
1
N1N2
∑
(r,s)∈C
Wn(y|x1r ,x2s,x3)
+
1
N1N2
∑
(r,s)∈D
Wn(y|x1r ,x2s,x3).
We analyse each term on the RHS seperately.
|A|
N1N2
≤ |PX1X2 |
|{(r, s) : (x1r ,x2s) ∈ T nX1,X2}|
N1N2
(a)
≤ 2−nǫ/2 for large enough n.
Here, (a) follows from (19) and by noting that the number of joint types is polynomial in n. Similarly, using (20)
|B|
N1N2
≤ |PX1X2X3 |
|{(r, s) : (x1r ,x2s,x3) ∈ T nX1,X2,X3}|
N1N2
≤ 2−nǫ/3 for large enough n.
We now analyse the third term.∑
(r,s)∈C
Wn(y|x1r ,x2s,x3) ≤
∑
PX1X2X3Y ∈PX1X2X3Y ∩Q
∑
y∈Tn
Y |X1,X2,X3
(x1r,x2s,x3)
Wn(y|x1r ,x2s,x3)
≤ |PX1X2X3Y | exp (−nD(PX1X2X3Y ||PX1X2X3W )).
Note that for any PX1X2X3Y , D(PX1X2X3Y ||PX1X2X3W ) = D(PX1X2X3Y ||PX1PX2PX3W )−I(X1X2;X3)−I(X1;X2).
If PX1X2X3Y ∈ Q, then D(PX1X2X3Y ||PX1X2X3W ) > η − 2ǫ and therefore,∑
(r,s)∈C
Wn(y|x1r ,x2s,x3) ≤ |PX1X2X3Y | exp (−n(η − 2ǫ))
≤ exp (−n(η − 3ǫ)) for large enough n,
→ 0 as n→∞ when η > 3ǫ.
We are left to analyze the last term. For (r, s) ∈ D, error happens when one of the following holds.
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(1) There exists u ∈ M1, u 6= r, v ∈ M2, v 6= s, x′3 ∈ Xn3 and random variables X ′1, X ′2, X ′3 such that
(x1r,x1u,x2s,x2v,x3,x
′
3,y) ∈ T nX1X′1X2X′2X3X′3Y and D(PX′1X′2X′3Y ||PX′1 × PX′2 × PX′3 × W ) < η and
I(X1X2Y ;X
′
1X
′
2|X3) ≥ η.
(2) There exists u ∈ M1, u 6= r,x′3 ∈ Xn3 and random variables X ′1, X ′3 such that (x1r,x1u,x2s,x3,x′3,y) ∈
T nX1X′1X2X3X′3Y
and D(PX′1X2X′3Y ||PX′1 × PX2 × PX′3 ×W ) < η and I(X1X2Y ;X ′1|X3) ≥ η.
(3) There exists u ∈M1, u 6= r, x2 ∈ Xn2 , t ∈M3 and random variablesX ′1, X ′2, X ′3 such that (x1r,x1u,x2s,x2,x3,x3t,y) ∈
T nX1X′1X2X′2X3X′3Y
and D(PX′1X′2X′3Y ||PX′1 × PX′2 × PX′3 ×W ) < η and I(X1X2Y ;X ′1X ′3|X3) ≥ η.
Let Q1 be the set of distributions PX1X′1X2X′2X3Y ∈ PX1X′1X2X′2X3Y satisfying D(PX1X2X3Y ||PX1PX2PX3W ) <
η, D(PX′1X′2X′3Y ||PX′1 × PX′2 × PX′3 ×W ) < η and I(X1X2Y ;X ′1X ′2|X3) ≥ η. When condition (1) holds,
1
N1N2
∑
(r,s)∈D
Wn(y|x1r ,x2s,x3)
≤ 1
N1N2
∑
r,s
∑
PX1X′1X2X
′
2X3Y
∈Q1
∑
u,v:(x1r ,x1u,x2s,x2v ,x3)
∈Tn
X1X
′
1X2X
′
2X3
, for some u6=r,v 6=s
∑
y∈Tn
Y |X1X
′
1
X2X
′
2
X3(x1r ,x1u,x2s,x2v,x3)
Wn(y|x1r ,x2s,x3).
(37)
From (25), we observe that it is sufficient to evaluate the right hand term only when
I(X1X2;X
′
1X
′
2X3)− |R1 +R2 − I(X ′1X ′2;X3)|+ ≤ ǫ. (38)
For a distribution PX1X′1X2X′2X3Y ∈ Q1 satisfying the above condition, let
Pe,X1X′1X2X′2X3Y =
∑
u,v:(x1r ,x1u,x2s,x2v ,x3)
∈Tn
X1X
′
1X2X
′
2X3
, for some u6=r,v 6=s
∑
y∈Tn
Y |X1,X
′
1,X2,X
′
2,X3(x1r,x1u,x2s,x2v,x3)
Wn(y|x1r ,x2s,x3)
(a)
≤ exp {n(|R1 +R2 − I(X ′1X ′2;X1X2X3)|+ + ǫ) + nH(Y |X1X ′1X2X ′2X3)− n(H(Y |X1X2X3)− ǫ)}
= exp {n (|R1 +R2 − I(X ′1X ′2;X1X2X3)|+ − I(Y ;X ′1X ′2|X1X2X3) + 2ǫ)}.
Here, (a) follows from (22) and properties of types. Let R1 +R2 < I(X
′
1X
′
2;X3),
I(Y ;X ′1X
′
2|X1X2X3) = I(X1X2Y ;X ′1X ′2|X3)− I(X1X2;X ′1X ′2|X3)
≥ I(X1X2Y ;X ′1X ′2|X3)− I(X1X2;X ′1X ′2X3)
≥ η − ǫ,
where the last inequality follows from the definition ofQ1 and (38). Also, R1+R2 < I(X ′1X ′2;X3) ≤ I(X ′1X ′2;X1X2X3).
Thus,
Pe,X1X′1X2X′2X3Y ≤ exp{−n(η − 3ǫ)}
→ 0 as n→ 0 if η > 3ǫ.
When R1 +R2 ≥ I(X ′1X ′2;X3), (38) implies
R1 +R2 > I(X
′
1X
′
2;X3) + I(X1X2;X
′
1X
′
2X3)− ǫ
= I(X ′1X
′
2;X3) + I(X1X2;X3) + I(X
′
1X
′
2;X1X2|X3)− ǫ
≥ I(X ′1X ′2;X1X2X3)− ǫ.
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This implies that |R1 +R2 − I(X ′1X ′2;X1X2X3)|+ ≤ R1 +R2 − I(X ′1X ′2;X1X2X3) + ǫ. Thus,
Pe,X1X′1X2X′2X3Y ≤ exp{n(R1 +R2 − I(X ′1X ′2;X1X2X3) + ǫ− I(Y ;X ′1X ′2|X1X2X3) + 2ǫ}
= exp{n(R1 +R2 − I(X ′1X ′2;X1X2X3Y ) + 3ǫ)}
≤ exp{n(R1 +R2 − I(X ′1X ′2;Y ) + 3ǫ)}.
Since PX′1X′2X′3Y is such that D(PX′1X′2X′3Y ||PX′1 × PX′2 × PX′3 ×W ) < η where η can be chosen arbitrarily small.
Thus, PX′1X′2X′3Y is arbitrarily close to PX˜1X˜2X˜3Y˜
def
= PX′1 × PX′2 × PX′3 × W . So, for small positive number γ1,
I(X ′1X
′
2;Y ) ≥ I(X˜1X˜2; Y˜ )− γ1 ≥ minPX′3 I(X˜1X˜2; Y˜ )− γ1. Thus, if
R1 +R2 < min
PX′
3
I(X˜1X˜2;Y )− 3ǫ− γ1, (39)
then, R1 +R2 ≤ min
PX′3
I(X ′1X
′
2;Y )− 3ǫ,
and therefore, Pe,X1X′1X2X′2X3Y → 0 as n→ 0. Since, there are only polynomially many types, this implies that (37)
tends to zero as n tends to infinity.
To analyse condition (2), let Q2 be the set of distributions PX1X′1X2X3Y ∈ PX1X′1X2X3Y satisfying
D(PX1X2X3Y ||PX1PX2PX3W ) < η, D(PX′1X2X′3Y ||PX′1 × PX2 × PX′3 ×W ) < η and I(X1X2Y ;X ′1|X3) ≥ η.
1
N1N2
∑
(r,s)∈D
Wn(y|x1r ,x2s,x3)
≤ 1
N1N2
∑
r,s
∑
PX1X′1X2X3Y
∈Q2
∑
u:(x1r,x1u,x2s,x3)
∈Tn
X1X
′
1X2X3
, for some u6=r
∑
y∈Tn
Y |X1X
′
1X2X3(x1r,x1u,x2s,x3)
Wn(y|x1r ,x2s,x3). (40)
From (23), we observe that it is sufficient to evaluate the right hand term only when
I(X1X2;X
′
1X3)− |R1 − I(X ′1;X3)|+ ≤ ǫ. (41)
For a distribution PX1,X′1,X2X3Y ∈ Q2 satisfying the above condition, let
Pe,X1 ,X′1,X2X3Y
=
∑
u:(x1r,x1u,x2s,x3)
∈Tn
X1X
′
1
X2X3
, for some u6=r
∑
y∈Tn
Y |X1X
′
1X2X3(x1r,x1u,x2s,x3)
Wn(y|x1r ,x2s,x3)
≤ exp {n(|R1 − I(X ′1;X1X2X3)|+ + ǫ) + nH(Y |X1X ′1X2X3)− n(H(Y |X1X2X3)− ǫ)}
= exp {n (|R1 − I(X ′1;X1X2X3)|+ − I(Y ;X ′1|X1X2X3) + 2ǫ)}.
Let R1 < I(X
′
1;X3), then
I(Y ;X ′1|X1X2X3) = I(X1X2Y ;X ′1|X3)− I(X1X2;X ′1|X3)
≥ I(X1X2Y ;X ′1|X3)− I(X1X2;X ′1X3)
≥ η − ǫ,
where the last inequality follows from the definition of Q2 and (41). Also, R1 < I(X ′1;X3) ≤ I(X ′1;X1X2X3). Thus,
Pe,X1,X′1,X2X3Y
≤ exp{−n(η − 3ǫ)}
→ 0 as n→ 0 if η > 3ǫ.
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When R1 ≥ I(X ′1;X3), (41) implies
R1 ≥ I(X ′1;X3) + I(X1X2;X ′1X3)− ǫ
= I(X ′1;X3) + I(X1X2;X3) + I(X1X2;X
′
1|X3)− ǫ
≥ I(X ′1;X1X2X3)− ǫ.
This implies that |R1 − I(X ′1;X1X2X3)|+ ≤ R1 − I(X ′1;X1X2X3) + ǫ. Thus,
Pe,X1,X′1,X2X3Y
≤ exp{n(R1 − I(X ′1;X1X2X3) + ǫ− I(Y ;X ′1|X1X2X3) + 2ǫ)}
= exp{n(R1 − I(X ′1;X1X2X3Y ) + 3ǫ)}
≤ exp{n(R1 − I(X ′1;X2Y ) + 3ǫ)}.
Since PX′1X2X′3Y is such that D(PX′1X2X′3Y ||PX′1 × PX2 × PX′3 ×W ) < η where η can be chosen arbitrarily small,
PX′1X2X′3Y is arbitrarily close to PX˜1X˜2X˜3Y˜
def
= PX′1×PX2×PX′3×W . So, for small positive number γ2, I(X ′1;X2Y ) ≥
I(X˜1; Y˜ |X˜2)− γ2 ≥ minPX′3 I(X˜1; Y˜ |X˜2)− γ2. Thus, if
R1 < min
PX′
3
I(X˜1; Y˜ |X˜2)− 3ǫ− γ2, (42)
then, R1 ≤ min
PX′
3
I(X ′1;Y |X2)− 3ǫ,
and therefore, Pe,X1,X′1,X2X3Y
→ 0 as n → 0. Since, there are only polynomially many types, this implies that (40)
tends to zero as n tends to infinity.
When condition (3) holds, let Q3 be the set of distributions PX1X′1X2X3X′3Y ∈ PX1X′1X2X3X′3Y satisfying
D(PX1X2X3Y ||PX1PX2PX3W ) < η, D(PX′1X′2X′3Y ||PX′1 × PX′2 × PX′3 ×W ) < η and I(X1X2Y ;X ′1X ′3|X3) ≥ η,
1
N1N2
∑
(r,s)∈D
Wn(y|x1r ,x2s,x3)
≤ 1
N1N2
∑
r,s
∑
PX1,X′1,X2,X3X
′
3
Y ∈Q3
∑
u,t:(x1r,x1u,x2s,x3,x3t)
∈Tn
X1X
′
1
X2X3X
′
3
, for some u6=r
∑
y∈Tn
Y |X1X
′
1
X2X3X
′
3
(x1r,x1u,x2s,x3,x3t)
Wn(y|x1r ,x2s,x3).
(43)
From (24), we observe that it is sufficient to evaluate the right hand term only when
I(X1X2;X
′
1X
′
3X3)− |R1 +R3 − I(X ′1X ′3;X3)|+ ≤ ǫ. (44)
For a distribution PX1X′1X2X3X′3Y ∈ Q3 satisfying the above condition, let
Pe,X1X′1X2X3X′3Y =
∑
u,t:(x1r,x1u,x2s,x3,x3t)
∈Tn
X1X
′
1X2X3X
′
3
, for some u6=r
∑
y∈Tn
Y |X1X
′
1
X2X3X
′
3
(x1r,x1u,x2s,x3,x3t)
Wn(y|x1r ,x2s,x3)
≤ exp {n(|R1 +R3 − I(X ′1X ′3;X1X2X3)|+ + ǫ) + nH(Y |X1X ′1X2X3X ′3)− n(H(Y |X1X2X3)− ǫ)}
= exp {n (|R1 +R3 − I(X ′1X ′3;X1X2X3)|+ − I(Y : X ′1X ′3|X1X2X3) + 2ǫ)}.
Let R1 + R3 < I(X
′
1X
′
3;X3), then
I(Y ;X ′1X
′
3|X1X2X3) = I(X1X2Y ;X ′1X ′3|X3)− I(X1X2;X ′1X ′3|X3)
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≥ I(X1X2Y ;X ′1X ′3|X3)− I(X1X2;X ′1X ′3X3)
≥ η − ǫ,
where the last inequality follows from the definition ofQ3 and (44). Also, R1+R3 < I(X ′1X ′3;X3) ≤ I(X ′1X ′3;X1X2X3).
Thus,
Pe,X1X′1X2X3X′3Y ≤ exp{−n(η − 3ǫ)}
→ 0 as n→ 0 if η > 3ǫ.
When R1 +R3 ≥ I(X ′1X ′3;X3), (44) implies
R1 +R3 > I(X
′
1X
′
3;X3) + I(X1X2;X
′
1X
′
3X3)− ǫ
= I(X ′1X
′
3;X3) + I(X1X2;X3) + I(X
′
1X
′
3;X1X2|X3)− ǫ
≥ I(X ′1X ′3;X1X2X3)− ǫ.
This implies that |R1 +R3 − I(X ′1X ′3;X1X2X3)|+ ≤ R1 +R3 − I(X ′1X ′3;X1X2X3) + ǫ. Thus,
Pe,X1X′1X2X3X′3Y ≤ exp{n(R1 +R3 − I(X ′1X ′3;X1X2X3) + ǫ− I(Y ;X ′1X ′3|X1X2X3) + 2ǫ}
= exp{n(R1 +R3 − I(X ′1X ′3;X1X2X3Y ) + 3ǫ)}
≤ exp{n(R1 +R3 − I(X ′1X ′3;Y ) + 3ǫ)}.
Since PX′1X′2X′3Y is such that D(PX′1X′2X′3Y ||PX′1 × PX′2 × PX′3 ×W ) < η where η can be chosen arbitrarily small.
Thus, PX′1X′2X′3Y is arbitrarily close to PX˜1X˜2X˜3Y˜
def
= PX′1 × PX′2 × PX′3 × W . So, for small positive number γ3,
I(X ′1X
′
3;Y ) ≥ I(X˜1X˜3; Y˜ )− γ3 ≥ minPX′2 I(X˜1X˜3; Y˜ )− γ3. Thus, if
R1 +R3 < min
PX′2
I(X˜1X˜3;Y )− 3ǫ− γ3, (45)
then, R1 +R3 ≤ min
PX′2
I(X ′1X
′
3;Y )− 3ǫ,
and therefore, Pe,X1X′1X2X3X′3Y → 0 as n→ 0. Since, there are only polynomially many types, this implies that (43)
tends to zero as n tends to infinity. By combining (39), (42) and (45), and analyzing the second term of (36) in a
similar manner, we get the following conditions on the set of achievable rates.
R1 +R2 < min
PX′
3
I(X˜1X˜2;Y )− δ1
R1 < min
PX′3
I(X˜1; Y˜ |X˜2)− δ2
R1 +R3 < min
PX′
2
I(X˜1X˜3;Y )− δ3
R2 < min
PX′
3
I(X˜2; Y˜ |X˜1)− δ4
R2 +R3 < min
PX′1
I(X˜2X˜3;Y )− δ5,
where δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4 and δ5 are positive constants which can be made arbitrarily small by choosing small enough ǫ and η.
The joint distribution of the random variables X˜1, X˜2 , X˜3 and Y is given by p(x1)p(x2)p(x3)WY |X1,X2,X3(y|x1, x2, x3).
Similarly, Pe,1 and Pe,2 tends to zero as n tends to infinity if, for all permutations (i, j, k) of (1, 2, 3) with k = 1
and k = 2 respectively, the following holds for a small positive constant δ which can be made arbitrarily small by
choosing small enough ǫ and η:
Ri < min
PX′
k
I(X˜i; Y˜ |X˜j)− δ,
26
Ri +Rj < min
PX′
k
I(X˜iX˜j ;Y )− δ.
Now, via a time sharing argument, we can conclude that all points in int(R) are achievable if the channel is non-
symmetrizable.
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Part II
Authenicated Communication in the Presence of
an Adversarial User
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Part 2
Authenicated Communication in the Presence of
an Adversarial User
2.1 Introduction
Consider a two-user memoryless multiple access channel (MAC) where one of the users may behave adversarially
(Fig. 6). If both users are non-adversarial, we require that their messages be reliably decoded. However, if one of the
users is adversarial, we would like to ensure that either the decoder correctly recovers the message of the other user or
detects the presence of an adversary and aborts7. In other words, an adversarial user may not cause an undetected
decoding error for the other (honest) user’s message. We call this the problem of authenticated communication
over MAC. We characterize the authenticated communication capacity region of the Discrete Memoryless MAC
(DM-MAC) and the Gaussian MAC.
F2
F1
WZ|X,Y φ
m2
Y n = F2(m2)
m1
Xn = F1(m1)
Zn
mˆ1, mˆ2
or
⊥,⊥
Figure 6: Adversarial MAC: Reliable decoding of both the messages is required when the users are non-adversarial. An adversarial user
must not cause an undetected decoding error for an honest user. Clearly, no decoding guarantees are given for adversarial user(s).
Adversary
A WV |U,S α(mˆ, ·)m
U t = A(m) V t
A/R
st or st0
mˆ
Figure 7: Point-to-point authentication over an AVC with “no attack” state s0: The receiver wants to authenticate whether a message
mˆ ∈ M it has received (via some unauthenticated means possibly controlled by an adversary) is indeed the actual message m ∈ M the
sender intended. The receiver must reject (R) a mˆ 6= m irrespective of whether there is an adversarial attack or not, but must accept (A)
when mˆ = m if there is no adversarial attack (i.e., when the state sequence of the AVC is st0).
We consider the possibility of using a standard MAC code to achieve unauthenticated communication followed by
authenticating the decoded messages using an authentication tag of vanishing rate. To this end, we study the following
point-to-point authentication problem which maybe of independent interest (Fig. 7): a receiver wants to authenticate
whether a message mˆ ∈ M it has received (via some unauthenticated communication channel possibly controlled by
7A more stringent requirement could be that even in the presence of adversarial behavior, the honest user’s message be reliably
decoded. It is easy to see that this setting amounts to treating the MAC as two arbitrarily varying channels (AVC) [1] where each
user treats the other as the adversary. Thus, the capacity region is the rectangular region defined by the AVC capacities of the two
channels, i.e., there is no trade-off between the rates. This observation holds true under deterministic coding, stochastic encoding, and
randomized coding settings under both maximum and average probabilities of error. The AVC capacity is zero whenever the channel is
symmetrizable [13] under maximum (resp., average) error criterion for codes with stochastic encoders (resp., deterministic codes). As we
will see in Remark 2.2, under our formulation, the capacity region is non-trivial when a condition weaker than non-symmetrizability is
satisfied.
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an adversary) is indeed the actual message m ∈ M the sender intended. The authentication is performed over a
memoryless arbitrarily varying channel (AVC) from the sender to the receiver that has a special “no-attack” state
symbol which represents the default behavior of the channel when there is no adversarial attack. The adversary,
when present, may choose the state sequence with the knowledge of the actual message m (and mˆ), but not the
channel input produced by the stochastic encoder using private randomness. The goal of the authentication scheme
is to ensure that the receiver does not accept a mˆ 6= m irrespective of whether there is an adversarial attack or
not, but does accept when mˆ = m if there is no adversarial attack (i.e., when the state of the AVC is set as the
“no-attack” symbol). We show that when the AVC can be used for authentication at all, the number of messages
grows double-exponentially in the tag blocklength t, i.e., log log |M| = tR for R > 0. We characterize the rate of
double-exponential growth of the size of messages which can be authenticated and show that this is in fact equal to
the Shannon capacity of the nominal channel for non-overwritable Discrete Memoryless AVCs (DM-AVCs) and for
Gaussian memoryless AVCs. Our results are reminiscent of identification capacity of Ahlswede and Dueck [14] and,
as will become clear, the connection is not coincidental (see Remark 2.4 and proofs of Theorem 2.2 and Lemma 2.7).
Returning to the MAC problem with a possibly adversarial user, we show that the following 3-phase scheme is
optimal (Fig. 8). In the first phase we use a standard MAC code to communicate the messages, albeit without any
guarantee that the decoded messages are indeed what the senders intended. In the second phase, user 1 authenticates
its message to the decoder while treating user 2 as a potential adversary; simultaneously, user 2 is required to send
a certain “no-attack” symbol8 from its channel input alphabet throughout this phase with deviation from this
amounting to adversarial behavior. In phase 3, the roles of the users are reversed. The double-exponential growth
of the number of messages that can be authenticated means that the authentication phase does not affect the rate
of communication; specifically, we may choose the authentication tag blocklength t = O(log n), where n is the
blocklength of the entire transmission. Thus, whenever positive rates of communication can be supported to both
users (either of whom may be adversarial), we can, in fact, support all points in the non-adversarial MAC capacity-
region itself. When a positive rate can be supported to only one of the users, we can support the largest rate of that
user in the non-adversarial MAC capacity-region.
The work that is closest to ours is by Kosut and Kliewer [15] which studies the same AVC model with a “no-attack”
symbol as in the point-to-point authentication problem above. However, they study the problem of authenticated
communication capacity, i.e., unlike the AVC setup above, where the receiver’s goal is to use the channel only to
authenticate a message mˆ it received through other means, in [15], the channel is used for the entire authenticated
communication. The goal is for the receiver to reliably decode the correct message when there is no attack and,
when under attack (i.e., the state sequence is not all “no-attack”), to either declare the presence of an adversary
or output the message transmitter intended. Clearly, the authenticated communication capacity cannot exceed the
Shannon capacity of the nominal channel (the channel where state is set to the “no-attack” symbol). The main result
of [15] is that, for finite alphabet-finite state channels, the Shannon capacity can be achieved unless the AVC meets
a condition called overwritability in which case the authenticated communication capacity is zero.
Our results for finite alphabet-finite state AVCs build on [15]; using capacity achieving authenticated communica-
tion codes from [15], we first conclude that when the AVC is not overwritable, authentication of a double-exponentially
growing number of messages is feasible. We also derive analogous results for additive Gaussian AVCs using an in-
dependent approach to first show that the (non-adversarial) Gaussian channel capacity is achievable even in the
authenticated communication setup. As in the finite alphabet-finite state setting, this allows us to show a double-
exponential growth of the number of messages that can be authenticated. These results show that, along the lines
of our MAC scheme, one way to achieve authenticated communication at rates approaching Shannon capacity of the
nominal channel is to first perform unauthenticated communication using a good code for the nominal channel, and
follow this up with a short authentication phase which does not affect the overall rate9. This gives an alternative
architecture (but not an alternative proof) for achieving the result in [15] and, arguably, explains the nature of
8As will be seen, to support any positive rate of communication to user 1 in the MAC, there must exist such a “no-attack” symbol in
user 2’s alphabet such that authentication is possible over the AVC from user 1 to the receiver resulting from the MAC by treating the
alphabet of user 2 as the set of states.
9Note that the result in [15] is for a deterministic encoder/decoder under average error criterion. The description here is for stochastic
encoder under maximum error as our authentication encoder is necessarily stochastic. However, standard techniques show that capacities
of authenticated communication under these two settings must be the same; also see Remark 2.1.
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that result – whenever authenticated communication is possible at all, since authentication can be performed with a
double-exponentially growing number of messages, the rate of communication is simply governed by the largest rate
of unauthenticated communication possible, i.e., the Shannon capacity of the nominal channel.
There are several strands of other related work. Communication over MACs with strategic users modeled as
a cooperative game has been studied in [8]. As noted in [16] in a different context, the authentication problem is
closely related to the identification problem. The latter has been the subject of extensive study for non-AVCs [14,17]
as well as AVCs [18]. Message authentication codes where the users have pre-shared keys and communicate over
noiseless channels have been extensively studied [19, 20]. Message authentication over noisy channels has also been
considered [21, 22]. These works differ from our point-to-point authentication problem: (a) the channel model is
different - the decoder either hears from the adversary or from the sender, but not from both as in an AVC, however,
the adversary may wiretap the transmitted signal, and (b) they also consider impersonation attacks where the
adversary aims to make the receiver accept a spurious message when the sender may not have a legitimate message
to send, something which does not arise in our problem. Byzantine attack on the nodes and edges of a network has
been studied under omniscient and weaker adversarial models in [10] and [11], respectively. Unlike the authenticated
communication model in the current paper, the decoders there are required to decode the source message under
byzantine attack. A Gaussian two-hop network with an eavesdropping and byzantine adversarial relay has been
considered in [23], where the requirement is decoding with message secrecy and byzantine attack detection.
The main contributions of our work are:
1. Authenticated communication capacity region of DM-MAC under adversarial users;
2. Authentication capacity of point-to-point DM-AVCs with a “no-attack” symbol;
3. Explains (arguably) the authenticated communication capacity result of Kosut & Kliewer [15] for DM-AVCs
with a “no-attack” symbol;
4. Analogous results for Gaussian channels.
2.2 Problem Setup and Main Results
2.2.1 Adversarial MAC
2.2.1.1 System model
Consider the two-user MAC setup shown in Fig. 6. The memoryless channel WZ|X,Y has input alphabets X ,Y, and
output alphabet Z. We consider stochastic encoders which use independent private randomness.
Definition 2.1 (Authenticated communication code). An (N1, N2, n) code for the DM-MAC WZ|X,Y consists of
the following:
(i) Two message sets, Mi = {1, . . . , N i}, i = 1, 2,
(ii) Two stochastic encoders, F1 :M1 → Xn and F2 :M2 → Yn, and
(iii) A deterministic decoder, φ : Zn → (M1 ×M2) ∪ {(⊥,⊥)}.
We define the probability of error in terms of the maximum error probabilities under no-attack and attack
conditions as follows. Let (Mˆ1, Mˆ2) = φ(Z
n).
Pe,no attack
def
= max
m∈M1×M2
PF1,F2
(
(Mˆ1, Mˆ2) 6= m|(M1,M2) = m
)
Pe,mal 1
def
= max
m2,xn
PF2
(
Mˆ2 /∈ {m2,⊥} |M2 = m2, Xn = xn
)
,
Pe,mal 2
def
= max
m1,yn
PF1
(
Mˆ1 /∈ {m1,⊥} |M1 = m1, Y n = yn
)
,
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where the probabilities are over the channel and the independent, private randomness of the stochastic encoders
indicated by the subscripts. The probability of error is defined as
Pe(F1, F2, φ) = max {Pe,no attack, Pe,mal 1, Pe,mal 2}.
Definition 2.2 (Achievable rate pair, Authenticated communication capacity region). We say that (R1, R2) is an
achievable authenticated communication rate pair if there exists a sequence of (⌊2nR1⌋, ⌊2nR2⌋, n) codes {F (n)1 , F (n)2 , φ(n)}∞n=1
such that limn→∞ Pe(F
(n)
1 , F
(n)
2 , φ
(n))→ 0. The authenticated communication capacity region Rauth−comm is the clo-
sure of the set of all achievable rate pairs.
2.2.1.2 Main result
Suppose X ,Y,Z are finite. We will use DM-MAC to refer to this channel. We need the following definition to state
our main result.
Definition 2.3 (Overwriting in DM-MAC). We say that user 1 can overwrite user 2 if there is a distribution PX′|X,Y
such that ∑
x′∈X
PX′|X,Y (x
′|x, y)W (z|x′, y′) =W (z|x, y) (46)
for all y, y′ ∈ Y, x ∈ X and z ∈ Z.
In other words, user 1 can overwrite user 2 if it (user 1) can replace any symbol y′ sent by user 2 with any symbol
y of its choosing while pretending to send any symbol x, again, of its choosing. In doing this, user 1 does not have
knowledge of the symbol y′ transmitted by user 2. Overwritability of user 1 by user 2 can be defined in a similar
manner.
Let Rnon−adv denote the non-adversarial capacity region of the DM-MAC with stochastic encoders under the
maximum probability of error criterion. By non-adversarial, we mean that both users are guaranteed to act honestly.
Note that this region is same as the usual non-adversarial capacity region of the DM-MAC under the average
probability of error criterion using deterministic codes [24]. The following theorem characterizes the authenticated
communication capacity of the DM-MAC.
Theorem 2.1. If the DM-MAC is such that neither user can overwrite the other, then Rauth−comm = Rnon−adv.
Otherwise, if user 1 can overwrite user 2, but user 2 cannot overwrite user 1,Rauth−comm = {(R, 0)|(R, 0) ∈ Rnon−adv}.
If user 2 can overwrite user 1, but user 1 cannot overwrite user 2, Rauth−comm = {(0, R)|(0, R) ∈ Rnon−adv}. When
both users can overwrite each other, Rauth−comm = {(0, 0)}.
Remark 2.1. We show in Appendix G that the capacity region of the DM-MAC for deterministic codes under
average probability of error criterion is the same as the capacity region we defined above (i.e., for codes with
stochastic encoders under maximum probability of error criterion).
Remark 2.2. As mentioned in Footnote 7, there are channels where the authenticated communication capacity
region of the DM-MAC is non-trivial, but the capacity region of the DM-MAC when the decoder is required to decode
the messages correctly with high probability even when under adversarial attack is zero. For example, consider the
so-called binary erasure MAC, the inputs are binary and the output Z = X + Y is ternary. It is easy to see that the
point-to-point channel from one user to the receiver treating the other user as an adversary is symmetrizable [13]
and thus the capacity of the point-to-point AVC is zero (for codes with stochastic encoders under maximum error
criterion). However, neither user can overwrite the other since, if one user sends 0, the other user cannot make it
look like 1 while pretending to send 1. Thus, by Theorem 2.1, the authenticated communication capacity region of
this channel is its non-adversarial MAC capacity region which is non-trivial, e.g., (3/4, 3/4) ∈ Rauth−comm.
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2.2.2 Authentication over an AVC
2.2.2.1 System model
Consider the setup shown in Fig. 7. The arbitrarily varying channel WV |U,S has input alphabet U , output alphabet
V and state stace S. The channel has a nominal or no attack state, s0, which is the default channel state when
there is no adversarial attack. The transmitter has access to the true message m and transmits a tag U t of length t.
The receiver has a candidate message mˆ and observes the received tag V t. Here mˆ may be different from m. The
adversary knows the true message m and the candidate message mˆ, but not the actual transmitted tag U t. We say
that the system is under attack if st is different from st0. The goal for the transmitter and the receiver is to be able
to authenticate the message mˆ by accepting it when the system is not under attack provided that mˆ equals m, and
by rejecting it if mˆ is different from m (regardless of whether there is an attack).
We formalize an authentication code for this setup as following.
Definition 2.4 (Authentication Code). An (N, t)-authentication code (A,α) for an AVC WV |U,S with state space S
and the no attack state s0 consists of
(i) a message set M = {1, 2, . . . , N},
(ii) a stochastic encoder A :M→ U t, and
(iii) a deterministic decoder α :M×Vt → {A,R}.
The authentication error probability Pe,auth(A,α) for an authentication code (A,α) is the maximum of PR|s0 , the
probability of false rejection under no attack, and PA, the probability of accepting a wrong message, i.e.,
PR|s0
def
= max
m∈M
P
(
α
(
m,V t
)
= R|St = st0,M = m
)
, (47)
PA
def
= max
m,mˆ∈M:mˆ 6=m
st∈St
P
(
α
(
mˆ, V t
)
= A|St = st,M = m) , (48)
Pe,auth(A,α)
def
= max
{
PR|s0 , PA
}
, (49)
where the probabilities are over the channel and the randomness of the stochastic encoder. Also, st0 is a t-length
vector consisting only of the no attack symbol s0 ∈ S.
Definition 2.5 (Achievable rates, Authentication Capacity). We say that R is an achievable authentication rate
for the AVC WV |U,S with the no attack state s0 if there exists a sequence of codes
{
(A(t), α(t))
}∞
t=1
such that
for each t, (A(t), α(t)) is a (⌊22tR⌋, t)-authentication code with the authentication error probabilities satisfying
limt→∞ Pe,auth(A
(t), α(t)) = 0. The authentication capacity Cauth of the AVC WV |U,S with the no attack state
s0 is the supremum over all achievable authentication rates.
2.2.2.2 Main result
We give the exact authentication capacity for AVCs with finite input, output, and state alphabets in the following
theorem. In particular, similar to the identification problem [14], we show that the number of messages that can be
authenticated with vanishingly small error probability scales doubly exponentially with the tag blocklength t provided
that the AVC is not overwritable. Let C(s0)
def
= maxPU I(U ;V |S = s0) denote the Shannon capacity of the nominal
channel (i.e., the AVC when the state is fixed to be s0). Following [15], we say that WV |U,S is overwritable if there
exists a conditional distribution PS|U ′ such that∑
s∈S
PS|U ′(s|u′)WV |U,S(v|u, s) =WV |U,S(v|u′, s0) (50)
for all (u, u′, v) ∈ U × U × V . If no such PS|U ′ exists, we say that WV |U,S is not overwritable.
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Theorem 2.2. For DM-AVC WV |U,S with a no attack state s0 ∈ S, the authentication capacity is given by
Cauth =
{
C(s0) if WV |U,S is not overwritable,
0 otherwise.
(51)
Remark 2.3. On the one hand, our proof of the above theorem builds on the result of Kosut and Kliewer [15] on
authenticated communication capacity of adversarial channels10. On the other hand, the above theorem gives us
insights into the nature of the result of [15]. There, the goal is to communicate (and not just authenticate) a message
m reliably when there is no attack and, when under attack, either abort (i.e., output ⊥) or output the intended
messagem, i.e., the decoder does not already possess a message mˆ which it simply wants to authenticate. Clearly, for
this authenticated communication problem, the rate (of single exponential growth of the message set) cannot exceed
the capacity C(s0) of the nominal channel. The result of [15] is that whenever the DM-AVC is not overwritable, the
authenticated communication capacity is indeed C(s0), and it is zero otherwise. The theorem above suggests, along
the lines of our MAC scheme (Fig. 8), an alternative architecture (but not an alternative proof) to achieve this result
– first perform unauthenticated communication using a good code for the nominal channel, and follow this up with a
short authentication phase which does not affect the overall rate11. Arguably, this explains the nature of the result
of [15] – whenever authenticated communication is possible at all, since authentication can be performed for a set of
doubly-exponentially growing number of messages, the rate of communication is simply governed by the largest rate
of unauthenticated communication possible, i.e., the Shannon capacity of the nominal channel.
Remark 2.4. The authentication problem studied here borrows features from the identification setup over non-
AVCs [14] as well as that over AVCs [18]. On the one hand, as also in the identification setup over the non-AVC
WV |U,S(.|., s0), we desire that the true message be accepted under no attack. On the other, as in the identification
setup over the AVC WV |U,S , we desire that a wrong candidate message be rejected regardless of the channel state
vector. However, unlike the identification setup, when the system is under attack, we do not have any requirement
on the decoder behavior if the candidate message is the same as the true message. Our proofs for authentication
further emphasize this connection as we build on ideas from [14] in our achievabilities as well as converses.
2.2.3 The Gaussian case
We derive analogues to Theorem 2.1, Theorem 2.2 and [15, Theorem 2] for additive Gaussian noise channels. We first
consider the adversarial MAC setting over an additive Gaussian MAC modeled as Z = X+Y +W , with X,Y, Z ∈ R
and W ∼ N (0, σ2). We assume that each legitimate user is subject to their power constraints, while an adversarial
user has no such power constraints and can output any real value.
Theorem 2.3. For an additive Gaussian adversarial MAC with average input power constraints ρ1 and ρ2 on the first
and second users and noise variance σ2, Rauth−comm equals the capacity region of the corresponding non-adversarial
MAC.
Our result builds on an authentication code for an additive Gaussian AVC, modeled as V = U + S +W , with
U, V, S ∈ R and W ∼ N (0, σ2). In the following theorem, we consider the authentication problem over an additive
Gaussian AVC whose channel input and output are real valued and are related as V = U + S +W , where S ∈ R is
adversarially chosen (and equals zero for the nominal channel), and W is zero mean Gaussian noise with variance
σ2. As in Theorem 2.2, we see that the maximum number of messages that can be authenticated grows doubly
exponentially with the blocklength, the exponent being equal to the capacity of the nominal channel.
10Note that we use the term “authenticated communication” to refer to the problem in [15] which is different from the “authentication”
problem of this section.
11Note that the result of [15] is for a deterministic encoder/decoder under average error criterion. The description here is for stochastic
encoder under maximum error as our authentication encoder is necessarily stochastic. However, the observation in Remark 2.1 applies
in this case too.
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Theorem 2.4. For an additive Gaussian AVC with average input power constraint ρ and noise variance σ2, the
authentication capacity equals the channel capacity of the nominal channel, i.e., Cauth =
1
2 log
(
1 + ρσ2
)
.
As in the case of Theorem 2.2, we prove Theorem 2.4 using an authenticated communication code for the additive
Gaussian AVC. The following theorem is an analogue of [15, Theorem 2] for the additive Gaussian AVC setting. Our
proof technique is significantly different from that of [15, Theorem 2], which relies on the finiteness of the alphabets
and the state-set.
Theorem 2.5. For an additive Gaussian AVC with average input power constraint ρ and noise variance σ2, the
authenticated communication capacity equals the channel capacity of the nominal channel, i.e., Cauth−comm =
1
2 log
(
1 + ρσ2
)
.
2.3 Proof Sketches
2.3.1 Proof sketch of Theorem 2.2
The detailed proof is given in Appendix D.
The achievability scheme involves transmitting an identification code for the identity channel [14, Proposition 1]
using an authenticated communication code. We use the observation that given a deterministic authenticated com-
munication code from [15] that has a small average probability of error, we can construct a stochastic authenticated
communication code with a slightly lower rate and with a small maximal probability of error. When the channel is
non-overwritable, the converse follows from the identification capacity converse for the channelWV |U,S(.|., s0). When
the channel is overwritable, for any message m′, the adversary can mount an attack under which, irrespective of the
actual message m, the output distribution is the same as for m′ under the nominal channel. Using this we argue
that Pe,auth ≥ 1/2.
2.3.2 Proof sketch of Theorem 2.1
The detailed proof is given is Appendix E.
Suppose neither user can overwrite the other. Our achievability scheme consists of three phases: a DM-MAC code (of
blocklength n, say) with stochastic encoders for non-adversarial users with maximum probability of error vanishing
as n → ∞ [24]; this is followed by two authentication phases, one for each user. While authenticating user 2, we
consider the point-to-point channel from user 2 to the receiver and treat user 1 as possibly adversarial. For this
AVC, user 1’s alphabet corresponds to the set of adversarial states. The following lemma shows that if user 1 cannot
overwrite user 2 (i.e., (46) does not hold), this AVC has a “no attack” state (x0 in the lemma) such that it is not
overwritable (i.e., (50) does not hold). This will allow us to use the authentication codes from Section 2.2.2 with tag
blocklength t = O(log n).
Lemma 2.6. When user 1 cannot overwrite user 2, there exists x0 ∈ X such that for all PX′|Y , there exists
(y, y′, z) ∈ Y × Y × Z, that satisfies ∑
x′∈X
PX′|Y (x
′|y)W (z|x′, y′) 6=W (z|x0, y). (52)
The proof follows by noting that if (52) does not hold, then, for every x ∈ X , we can find an attack distribution
PX′|X=x,Y which satisfies (46). Also, note that the resulting nominal channel W (.|x0, .) has non-zero capacity. If
not, consider a distribution PX′|Y in (52) such that PX′|Y (x0|y) = 1, for all y ∈ Y. This implies that W (z|x0, y′) 6=
W (z|x0, y) for some z ∈ Z and y, y′ ∈ Y. Similarly, for the AVC from user 1 to the receiver with Y as the state
alphabet, we can find a no-attack state y0 ∈ Y for which it is non-overwritable. Our coding scheme is depicted in
Fig. 8. The decoder outputs a message pair estimate only if both of the authentication decoders accept, otherwise it
outputs (⊥,⊥) to declare the presence of an adversarial user. We show vanishing error probabilities for all rates pairs
in Rnon−adv. The converse follows from arguing that a user (say, user 1) who can overwrite the other can induce a
channel output distribution corresponding to any message pair (m′1,m
′
2) of its choosing irrespective of the message
(m2) the overwritten user sends.
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y0, . . . , y0
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x0, . . . , x0
t
Unauth. MAC code Auth. 1 Auth. 2
Figure 8: A 3-phase scheme for authenticated communication over MAC. The tag blocklengths t = O(logn) of the authentication phases
are much smaller than the blocklength n of the preceding unauthenticated communication phase.
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Figure 9: To prove Lemma 2.7, we consider a stochastic encoder A for the authentication code that is the composition of an identification
encoder B for the identity channel from [14, Proposition 1], an appropriately chosen permutation pi, and an encoder g for a channel code
with codewords of power 25σ2 and minimum distance at least 7σ
√
t. The identification code guarantees a small overlap between Am (all
codewords for m, denoted by ut(i)’s), and Amˆ (all codewords for mˆ, denoted by uˆt(i)’s) for every pair of messages m 6= mˆ. Next, we use
a concentration argument over the random selection (under a uniform choice of pi) of the set Am \ Amˆ from the set of all codewords for
g that are not in Amˆ to argue that, w.h.p., under a fixed st, at most a small fraction of codewords from Am \ Amˆ lie within a distance
3σ
√
t of any codeword in Amˆ. This shows a small misauthentication probability for a fixed m, mˆ, and st. Finally, we take a union bound
to show that this also holds for all m, mˆ, and a sufficiently dense set of adversarial state vectors.
2.3.3 Proof sketches for the Gaussian case
The detailed proofs are given in Appendix F.
We first prove Theorem 2.5. The achievability proof departs significantly from the finite alphabet setting of [15,
Theorem 2]. We use a two stage code consisting of a channel code for (non-authenticated) communication over
blocklength n on the nominal Gaussian channel followed by followed by an authentication tag of blocklength t =
O(log n). The existence of such a code is guaranteed by Lemma 2.7, which shows that the number of authenticable
messages scales doubly exponentially with the tag blocklength.
Lemma 2.7. For an additive Gaussian AVC with input power constraint 25σ2 and noise variance σ2, Cauth > 0.
The main ideas behind the proof of Lemma 2.7 are illustrated in Fig. 9. Using Theorem 2.5, the proofs of
Theorems 2.4 and 2.3 follow on similar lines as the finite alphabet setting. The converse in Theorem 2.4 follows
from the identification capacity converse for the nominal Gaussian channel [17], while the achievability uses an
authenticated communication code for the adversarial Gaussian AVC to authenticably transmit an identification code
for the noiseless channel. Finally, we show the achievability in Theorem 2.3 by using a three-phase communication
scheme using the authentication code from Theorem 2.4 (similar to the proof of Theorem 2.1).
D Authentication over DM-AVCs: capacity characterization (Proof of
Theorem 2.2)
Before proving this result, we restate the definition of an identification code over an AVC from [18].
Definition 2.6 (Identification Code). An (N, t)-identification code (B, β) for an arbitrarily varying channel WV |U,S
with state space S consists of
1. an index set M = {1, 2, . . . , N},
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2. a stochastic encoder B :M→ U t, and
3. a decoder β :M×Vt → {A,R}.
The misidentification probability Pe,id(B, β) for an identification code (B, β) is the maximum, over all channel
state sequences and messages, of PR, the probability of incorrectly rejecting the true message and PA, the probability
of incorrectly accepting any given message other than the true message, i.e.,
PR
def
= max
m∈M,st∈St
P
(
β(m,V t) = R|St = st,M = m) ,
PA
def
= max
m∈M,st∈St,mˆ6=m
P
(
β(mˆ, V t) = A|St = st,M = m) , and
Pe,id
def
= max {PR, PA} .
Definition 2.7 (Achievable Rates, Identification Capacity). We say that R is an achievable identification rate for
the AVC WV |U,S if there exists a sequence of codes
{
(B(t), β(t))
}∞
t=1
such that for each t, (B(t), β(t)) is a (⌊22tR⌋, t)-
identification code with the identification error probabilities satisfying limt→∞ Pe,id(B
(t), β(t)) = 0. Finally, we define
the identification capacity of the AVC WV |U,S as the supremum over all achievable identification rates.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. For the converse, we note that any (N, t)-authentication code (A,α) for the AVC WV |U,S
is also an (N, t)-identification code for the nominal channel WV |U,S(.|., s0) such that Pe,id(A,α) ≤ Pe,auth(A,α).
Thus, the authentication capacity for the the AVC WV |U,S is bounded from above by the identification capacity
of the the nominal channel WV |U,S(.|., s0). By [14], the latter equals C(s0). For ut ∈ U t and m ∈ M, de-
fine the distribution QUt|M (u
t|m) def= P(A(m) = ut). When the channel is overwritable, suppose some R > 0
is achievable. Let m,m′ ∈ M,m 6= m′ be two distinct messages. Consider the adversarial strategy PSt(st) =∑
u˜t∈Ut QUt|M (u˜
t|m′)∏ti=1 PS|U ′(si|u˜i). Here, si and u˜i are ith elements of the sn and u˜n sequences respectively
and PS|U ′ satisfies (50).
Let PA,m→m′ be the probability of accepting m
′ under the adversarial attack described above when m was
actually sent and PR,m be the probability of rejecting m, when m was sent and there was no attack. For m ∈M, let
α−1(A,m)
def
= {vt : α(m, vt) = A}. Then,
PA,m→m′ =
∑
ut∈Ut
Q(ut|m)
∑
st∈St
PSt(s
t)
∑
vt∈α−1(A,m′)
t∏
i=1
W (vi|ui, si)
=
∑
ut∈Ut,vt∈α−1(A,m′)
Q(ut|m)
∑
u˜t∈Ut
Q(u˜t|m′)
∑
st∈St
t∏
i=1
PS|U ′(si|u˜i)W (vi|ui, si)
(a)
=
∑
ut∈Ut,vt∈α−1(A,m′)
Q(ut|m)
∑
u˜t∈Ut
Q(u˜t|m′)
t∏
i=1
W (vi|u˜i, s0)
=
∑
u˜t∈Ut,vt∈α−1(A,m′)
Q(u˜t|m′)
t∏
i=1
W (vi|u˜i, s0)
= 1− PR,m′ ,
where (a) follows from (50). This implies that PR,m′ + PA,m→m′ = 1. Hence, PR + PA ≥ 1. This implies that N ≤ 1
for any (N, t)-authentication code with Pe,auth(A,α) <
1
2 . Therefore, the authentication capacity of WV |U,S is zero.
Next, we show the achievability when WV |U,S is not overwritable by constructing a sequence of authentication
codes for large enough blocklengths. Our construction consists of an identification code for an identity channel that
is sent using an authenticated communication code.
Let R < C(s0), ǫ ∈ [0, 1], and t∗ be large enough. Lemma 2.15 and [14, Proposition 1] guarantee that the following
hold for every t > t∗. Let t˜ = ⌈Rt⌉ and let δ > 0.
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• There exists a (stochastic) (22
t˜−δ
, t˜)-identification code (B, β) for the identity channel with Pe,id ≤ ǫ/2.
• There exits a (stochastic) (2t˜, t)-authenticated communication code (F, φ) for the channel WV |U,S with the
nominal state s0 and e(F, φ) ≤ ǫ/2 (see Appendix H for the definition of an authenticated communication code
and its error probability).
Consider the stochastic encoder A :
{
0, 1, . . . , 22
t˜−δ
}
→ U t and the decoder α :
{
0, 1, . . . , 22
t˜−δ
}
× Vt → {A,R},
where, for every m, mˆ ∈
{
0, 1, . . . , 22
t˜−δ
}
, ut ∈ U t, and vt ∈ Vt,
PA
(
A(m) = ut
)
= PF,B
(
F (B(m)) = ut
)
, and
α(mˆ, vt) =
{
A if φ(vt) 6= ⊥ and β(mˆ, φ(vt)) = A
R otherwise.
We claim that (A,α) is a (22
t˜−δ
, t)-authentication code for the channel WV |U,S with the nominal state s0 and
Pe,auth(A,α) ≤ ǫ. Note that as ǫ and δ can be made arbitrarily small, showing the above amounts to proving the
achievability all all rates below C(s0).
To this end, let M , U˜ t˜ and U t, be the random variables denoting the message, the stochastic output of the
identification encoder B upon input M , and the stochastic output of the encoder F upon input U˜ t˜, respectively. For
any fixed st ∈ St, let V t denote the random vector corresponding to the channel output when the channel input is
U t.
We first analyze the probability that (A,α) rejects the true message under no attack. Let E1 def=
{
φ(V t) 6= U˜ t˜
}
denote the event that the authenticated communication code makes a decoding error. Note that when there is
no attack, the probability of the event E1 is no larger than ǫ/2 by our choice of (F, φ). Further when under Ec1 ,
α(mˆ, V t) = β(mˆ, U˜ t˜) for every mˆ ∈
{
0, 1, . . . , 22
t˜−δ
}
. Using these, we note that, for any mˆ ∈
{
0, 1, . . . , 22
t˜−δ
}
,
PA,W
(
α(mˆ, V t) = R|St = st0,M = m
)
(53)
= PA,W
({
α(mˆ, V t) = R
}
, E1|St = st0,M = m
)
+ PA,W
({
α(mˆ, V t) = R
}
, Ec1 |St = st0,M = m
)
(54)
≤ PF,W
(E1|St = st0,M = m)+ PB,F,W (α(mˆ, V t) = R|Ec1 , St = st0,M = m) (55)
= PF,W
(E1|St = st0,M = m)+ PB (β(mˆ, U˜ t˜) = R|M = m) (56)
≤ ǫ/2 + PB
(
β(mˆ, U˜ t˜) = R|M = m
)
. (57)
Recall that, when mˆ equals m, by our choice of (B, β), PB
(
β(m, U˜ t˜) = R|M = m
)
≤ ǫ/2. Thus, we have
PA,W
(
α(m,V t) = R|St = st0,M = m
) ≤ ǫ. (58)
Next, we analyze the probability that (A,α) accepts an incorrect message under any state vector. Let E⊥ def=
{φ(V t) = ⊥}. Note that E⊥ ⊆ E1 and by our choice of (F, φ), the probability of the event E1 \E⊥ is no larger than ǫ/2
for any state vector. Further, when under E⊥, α(mˆ, V t) equals R with probability one. Thus, for any m, mˆ ∈ {0, 1}t˜
and st ∈ St, we have
PA,W
(
α(mˆ, V t) = A|St = st,M = m) (59)
= PA,W
({
α(mˆ, V t) = A
}
, E⊥|St = st,M = m
)
+ PA,W
({
α(mˆ, V t) = A
}
, E1 \ E⊥|St = st,M = m
)
(60)
+ PA,W
({
α(mˆ, V t) = A
}
, Ec1 |St = st,M = m
)
(61)
= 0 + PA,W
({
α(mˆ, V t) = A
}
, E1 \ E⊥|St = st,M = m
)
+ PA,W
({
α(mˆ, V t) = A
}
, Ec1 |St = st,M = m
)
(62)
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≤ PF,W
(E1 \ E⊥|St = st,M = m)+ PB,F,W (α(mˆ, V t) = A|Ec1 , St = st,M = m) (63)
= PF,W
(E1 \ E⊥|St = st,M = m)+ PB (β(mˆ, U˜ t˜) = A|M = m) (64)
≤ ǫ/2 + PB
(
β(mˆ, U˜ t˜) = A|M = m
)
(65)
When mˆ 6= m, by our choice of (B, β), PB
(
β(mˆ, U˜ t˜) = A|M = m
)
≤ ǫ/2. Thus, we have
PA,W
(
α(mˆ, V t) = A|St = st,M = m) ≤ ǫ. (66)
This shows that Pe,auth(A,α) ≤ ǫ.
E Authenticated Communication over Multiple Access Channels (Proof
of Theorem 2.1)
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Converse: Suppose user 1 can overwrite user 2. Let, if possible, for some N2 > 1, there
exists an (N1, N2, n) authenticated communication code with vanishing error probabilities. Define Q1(x
n|m1) def=
P(F1(m1) = x
n), m2 ∈ M2 and Q2(yn|m2) def= P(F2(m2) = yn), m2 ∈ M2. Let m1 ∈ M1, m2,m′2 ∈ M2 such that
m2 6= m′2. Consider an adversarial strategy P˜Xn where user 1 overwrites any message sent by user 2 by an encoding
of m′2 while pretending to send message m1, i.e., for x˜
n ∈ Xn,
P˜Xn(x˜
n) =
∑
xn∈Xn,yn∈Yn
Q1(x
n|m1)Q2(yn|m′2)
(
n∏
i=1
PX′|X,Y (x˜i|xi, yi)
)
. (67)
where x˜i, xi and yi are i
th elements of the x˜n, xn and yn sequences respectively and PX′|X,Y satisfies (46). Let
Pe,mal 1,m1,m2→m′2 be the probability of accepting (m1,m
′
2) when user 2 sends m2 and user 1 sends an x˜
n sequence
according to the distribution given by (67). Let Pe,no attack,m1,m2 denote the probability of rejecting (m1,m2) when
(m1,m2) was sent and there was no attack. Define φ
−1(m1,m
′
2)
def
= {zn : φ(zn) = (m1,m′2)} and Wn(zn|x˜n, y˜n) def=∏n
i=1W (zi|xi, yi) where zi is the ith element of zn. Then,
Pe,mal 1,m1,m2→m′2 =
∑
x˜n∈Xn,y˜n∈Yn
P˜Xn(x˜
n)Q2(y˜
n|m2)P
((
Mˆ1, Mˆ2
)
= (m1,m
′
2) |Xn = x˜n, Y n = y˜n
)
=
∑
x˜n∈Xn,y˜n∈Yn
zn∈φ−1(m1,m′2)
P˜Xn(x˜
n)Q2(y˜
n|m2)Wn(zn|x˜n, y˜n)
=
∑
x˜n∈Xn,y˜n∈Yn
zn∈φ−1(m1,m′2)
Q2(y˜
n|m2)
∑
xn∈Xn,yn∈Yn
Q1(x
n|m1)Q2(yn|m′2)
(
n∏
i=1
PX′|X,Y (x˜i|xi, yi)W (zi|x˜i, y˜i)
)
=
∑
zn∈φ−1(m1,m′2)
y˜n∈Yn
Q2(y˜
n|m2)
∑
xn∈Xn,yn∈Yn
Q1(x
n|m1)Q2(yn|m′2)
(
n∏
i=1
(∑
x˜i∈X
PX′|X,Y (x˜i|xi, yi)W (zi|x˜i, y˜i)
))
(a)
=
∑
zn∈φ−1(m1,m′2)
y˜n∈Yn
Q2(y˜
n|m2)
∑
xn∈Xn,yn∈Yn
Q1(x
n|m1)Q2(yn|m′2)Wn(zn|xn, yn)
=
∑
xn∈Xn,yn∈Yn,zn∈φ−1(m1,m′2)
Q1(x
n|m1)Q2(yn|m′2)Wn(zn|xn, yn)
39
= 1− Pe,no attack,m1,m′2 ,
where (a) follows from (46). This implies that Pe,no attack,m1,m′2 +Pe,mal 1,m1,m2→m′2 = 1. Hence, we get Pe,no attack+
Pe,mal 1 ≥ 1 whenever N2 > 1. Thus, N2 = 1 and Rauth−comm ⊆ {(R, 0) | (R, 0) ∈ Rnon−adv}. Similarly, when
user 2 can overwrite user 1, Rauth−comm ⊆ {(0, R) | (0, R) ∈ Rnon−adv}. This also implies that when both users can
overwrite each other, Rauth−comm = {(0, 0)}.
Achievability: Suppose neither user can overwrite the other. The scheme when one user can overwrite the
other, but not vice versa, follows similarly. Our achievability scheme consists of three phases: a DM-MAC code (of
blocklength n, say) with stochastic encoders for non-adversarial users with maximum probability of error vanishing
as n→∞; this is followed by two authentication phases, one for each user. While authenticating user 2, we consider
the point-to-point channel from user 2 to the receiver and treat user 1 as possibly adversarial. For this AVC, user 1’s
alphabet corresponds to the set of adversarial states. The following lemma shows that if user 1 cannot overwrite
user 2 (i.e., equation (46) does not hold), this AVC has a “no attack” state (x0 in the lemma) such that it is not
overwritable (i.e., equation (50) does not hold). This will allow us to use the authentication codes from Section 2.2.2
with blocklength t = O(log n).
Lemma 2.6. When user 1 cannot overwrite user 2, there exists x0 ∈ X such that for all PX′|Y , there exists (y, y′, z) ∈
Y × Y × Z, that satisfies ∑
x′∈X
PX′|Y (x
′|y)W (z|x′, y′) 6=W (z|x0, y). (52)
Proof. If user 1 cannot overwrite user 2, then from (46) it follows that for all PX′|X,Y , there exist y, y
′ ∈ Y, x ∈
X and z ∈ Z such that ∑
x′
PX′|X,Y (x
′|x, y)W (z|x′, y′) 6=W (z|x, y).
This implies that there is a symbol x0 ∈ X such that for all PX′|Y , there are y, y′ ∈ Y, z ∈ Z such that∑
x′
PX′|Y (x
′|y)W (z|x′, y′) 6=W (z|x0, y). (68)
If not, then, for every x ∈ X , we can find an attack distribution PX′|X=x,Y which satisfies (46).
Also, note that the resulting nominal channel W (.|x0, .) has non-zero capacity. If not, consider a distribution
PX′|Y in (52) such that PX′|Y (x0|y) = 1, for all y ∈ Y. This implies that W (z|x0, y′) 6= W (z|x0, y) for some z ∈ Z
and y, y′ ∈ Y. Similarly, for the AVC from user 1 to the receiver with Y as the state alphabet, we can find a no-attack
state y0 ∈ Y for which the AVC is non-overwritable. Our coding scheme is depicted in Fig. 6. We will use C(x0) and
C(y0) to refer to the capacities of WZ|X,Y (.|x0, .) and WZ|X,Y (.|., y0) respectively.
Consider a rate pair (R1, R2) ∈ Rnon−adv. For any δ, ǫ > 0, we will show that there exists an (N1, N2, n) authen-
ticated communication code (F1, F2, φ) with limn→∞
logN1
n ≥ R1−δ1+2δ , limn→∞ logN2n ≥ R1−δ1+2δ and Pe(F1, F2, φ) ≤ ǫ.
We start by noting that for all large enough numbers, say n ≥ n′, there exist (2n(R1−δ), 2n(R2−δ), n) stochastic codes
(F1,MAC, F2,MAC, φMAC) for the non-adversarial DM-MAC such that the maximum probability of error is bounded
above by ǫ2 . Fix 0 < r < min{C(x0), C(y0)} and a > 1r . Let t
def
= a logn. Theorem 2.2 implies that for all large
numbers, say n ≥ n′′, there exist
(
22
tr
, t
)
authentication codes (A1, α1) for the adversarial AVC WZ|X,Y with Y as
the set of states and y0 as the no attack state such that Pe,auth(A1, α1) ≤ ǫ4 . Similarly, for all large numbers, say
n ≥ n′′′, there exist
(
22
tr
, t
)
authentication codes (A2, α2) for the adversarial AVC WZ|X,Y with X as the set of
states and x0 as the no attack state such that Pe,auth(A2, α2) ≤ ǫ4 . Choose n > max {n′, n′′, n′′′} which also satisfies
2tr > max {nR1, nR2} and t < δn.
Encoding. For (m1,m2) ∈M1 ×M2, the encoders are defined as
F1 (m1)
def
=
(
F1,MAC (m1) , F1,auth (m1) , x
t
0
)
,
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F2 (m2)
def
=
(
F2,MAC (m2) , y
t
0, F2,auth (m1)
)
,
where xt0 and y
t
0 are t length sequences of x0 and y0 respectively.
Decoding. Let (m˜1, m˜2) = φMAC(z
n). The decoder is defined as
φ
(
zn+2t
)
=


φMAC (z
n) , α1
(
m˜1, z
n+t
n+1
)
= A and
α2
(
m˜2, z
n+2t
n+t+1
)
= A,
(⊥,⊥) , otherwise.
Analysis of probability of error. Let (M˜1, M˜2) = φMAC(Z
n). Under no attack, for all (m1,m2) ∈M2 ×M2,
P
(
φ
(
Zn+2t
) 6= (m1,m2) |M1 = m1,M2 = m2 ) = P(φ (Zn+2t) 6= (m1,m2) ,(M˜1, M˜2) 6= (m1,m2) |M1 = m1,M2 = m2)
+ P
(
φ
(
Zn+2t
) 6= (m1,m2) ,(M˜1, M˜2) = (m1,m2) |M1 = m1,M2 = m2)
≤ P
((
M˜1, M˜2
)
6= (m1,m2) |M1 = m1,M2 = m2
)
+ P
({
α1
(
m1, Z
n+t
n+1
)
= R
} |M1 = m1 )
+ P
({
α2
(
m2, Z
n+2t
n+t+1
)
= R
} |M2 = m2 )
≤ ǫ
2
+
ǫ
4
+
ǫ
4
≤ ǫ
Under attack by user 1, for all m2 ∈M2 and xn+2t ∈ Xn+2t,
P
(
Mˆ2 /∈ {m2,⊥}
∣∣M2 = m2, Xn+2t = xn+2t) = P(M˜2 = m2, Mˆ2 /∈ {m2,⊥} ∣∣M2 = m2, Xn+2t = xn+2t)
+ P
(
M˜2 6= m2, Mˆ2 /∈ {m2,⊥}
∣∣M2 = m2, Xn+2t = xn+2t)
≤ 0 + P
(
α2
(
M˜2, Z
n+2t
n+t+1
)
= A
∣∣∣M2 = m2, Xn+2t = xn+2t, M˜2 6= m2)
≤ ǫ
4
.
Similarly, under attack by user 2, for all m1 ∈ M1 and yn+2t ∈ Yn+2t,
P
(
Mˆ1 /∈ {m1,⊥}
∣∣M1 = m1, Y n+2t = yn+2t) ≤ ǫ
4
.
Thus, Pe(F1, F2, φ) ≤ ǫ. Let {ǫk}∞k=1 be a decreasing sequence of positive numbers with limk→∞ ǫk → 0. For each
ǫk, k ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, we can find an n such that there exists a (2n(R1−δ), 2n(R2−δ), n+2t) authenticated communication
code (Fn+2t1 , F
n+2t
2 , φ
n+2t) for the DM-MAC WZ|X,Y such that Pe(F
n+2t
1 , F
n+2t
2 , φ
n+2t) ≤ ǫk. Thus, we can find
a sequence of (2n(R1−δ), 2n(R2−δ),n+2t) codes with limn→∞ Pe(F
n+2t
1 , F
n+2t
2 , φ
n+2t) → 0. In fact, it is not difficult
to see that we can find a sequence of (2n
R1−δ
1+2δ , 2n
R2−δ
1+2δ , n) authenticated communication codes (F
(n)
1 , F
(n)
2 , φ
(n)) with
Pe(F
(n)
1 , F
(n)
2 , φ
(n))→ 0 as n goes to infinity12. This implies that the rate pair
(
R1−δ
1+2δ ,
R2−δ
1+2δ
)
is achievable. Since, δ is
any positive number and Rauth−comm is the closure of the set of all achievable rates, we have (R1, R2) ∈ Rauth−comm.
Hence, Rauth−comm = Rnon−adv when the channel is non-overwritable.
12First note that to achieve the given rates and error probabilities, we may use MAC codes of blocklength n, n + 1, n + 2, . . . and
authentication codes of tag length t, t + 1, t + 2, . . . (since if r is such that 22
tr
> 2nR, 22
(t+1)r
> 22
(n+1)R
for large enough n).Thus,
we get codes for every third integer after some n + 2t. If we choose n such that 22
tr
> max {2(n+2)R1 , 2(n+2)R2}, we can increase the
blocklength of just the MAC code to n+ 1 and n+ 2 which fills in the gaps while ensuring the same error probability.
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F Gaussian channels
F.1 Positivity of authentication capacity for additive Gaussian AVCs
In the following, we prove Lemma 2.7. We show that when the maximum average input power allowed is 25σ2,
positive authentication rates are achievable. Note that this also implies the positivity of authentication capacity
when the input power constraint is smaller than 25σ2 – one may start with a larger block so that we have enough
energy budget to obtain at least 25σ2 average power on part of the block.
Proof of Lemma 2.7. In the following, we argue that, for any desired upper bound on the misauthentication prob-
ability, for every large enough blocklength t, there exist authentication codes with positive rate for the additive
Gaussian AVC. To this end, we let ǫ ∈ (0, 1/2), 0 < R < 1/8, 0 < R˜ < 1, 0 < δ < min{ǫ/10, 1/ (21/2ǫ + 1)},
t˜ = ⌊Rt⌋, N = ⌊22R˜t˜⌋, and M = [1 : N ]. Consider a (N, t)-authentication code chosen according the following
random procedure.
First, let (B, β) be a (N, t˜)-identification code for the identity channel [14, Proposition 1] satisfying the following
properties:
(A) For each m ∈ M, the output of the stochastic encoder B(m) is uniformly distributed over a set Bm ⊂ {0, 1}t˜
with |Bm| = ⌊δ2t˜⌋.
(B) The Pe,id(B, β) = maxm,mˆ∈M:m 6=mˆ |Bmˆ ∩ Bm|/|Bm| < ǫ/2.
Next, let (g, γ) be a (2t˜, t)-channel code for the additive Gaussian AVC satisfying the following:
(C) For each u˜ ∈ {0, 1}t˜, ‖g(u˜)‖2 = 5σ
√
t.
(D) For each pair u˜, u˜′ ∈ {0, 1}t˜ with u˜ 6= u˜′, ‖g(u˜)− g(u˜′)‖2 ≥ 7σ
√
t.
The existence of such a code is guaranteed by [27]. Note that property (D) implies that, for large enough t, the
maximal probability of decoding error for (g, γ) is no larger than ǫ/2. Finally, let π : {0, 1}t˜ → {0, 1}t˜ be an
appropriately chosen permutation. We comment on the choice of π in the proof below. Once π is chosen, it is fixed
and is assumed to be known to all parties.
Using the above, define the (N, t)-authentication code (A,α) as follows.
• Let A :M→ Rt be a stochastic encoder with A = g ◦ π ◦ B, i.e., for every m ∈ M and ut ∈ Rt, PA(A(m) =
ut) = PB(g(π(B(m))) = u
t). For each m ∈ M, let Am be the set of codewords that are output with non-zero
probability when the message is m. From property (A), note that A(m) is uniformly distributed over Am and
|Am| = ⌊δ2t⌋. Let A = ∪m∈MAm
• Let α :M× Rt → {A,R} be a deterministic decoder such that for every mˆ ∈ M, and vt ∈ Rt,
α(mˆ, vt) =
{
A if ∃ uˆt ∈ Amˆ s.t. ‖vt − uˆt‖2 < 32σ
√
t
R otherwise.
(69)
We first note that for the code (A,α) defined above,
PR|s0(A,α) ≤ PR(B, β) + Pe(g, γ) (70)
≤ 0 + ǫ
2
(71)
=
ǫ
2
. (72)
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Next, that there exists a π such that we show that PA(A,α) ≤ ǫ. To this end, we use the probabilistic method
by first replacing π by a permutation Π drawn uniformly from the set of all permutations over {0, 1}t˜. As with
π, we assume that drawn permutation Π is known to all the parties, including an adversary. We argue that,
with a high probability over the choice of Π, PA(A,α) ≤ ǫ. To this end, for each mˆ ∈ M and st ∈ St, let
D(mˆ, st) def= {ut ∈ A : ‖ut + st − uˆt‖2 < 3σ√t for some uˆt ∈ Amˆ}.
Let m, mˆ ∈M with m 6= mˆ and let st ∈ Rt. We have
PW t,A
(
α
(
mˆ, V t
)
= A|M = m,St = st) (73)
= PW t,A
(
α
(
mˆ, A(m) + st +W t
)
= A
)
(74)
=
1
|Am|
∑
ut∈Am
PW t
(
α
(
mˆ, ut + st +W t
)
= A
)
(75)
=
1
|Am|
∑
ut∈Am∩D(mˆ,st)
PW t
(
α
(
mˆ, ut + st +W t
)
= A
)
(76)
+
1
|Am|
∑
ut∈Am\D(mˆ,st)
PW t
(
α
(
mˆ, ut + st +W t
)
= A
)
(77)
≤ |Am ∩ D(mˆ, s
t)|
|Am| (78)
+
1
|Am|
∑
ut∈Am\D(mˆ,s
t)
uˆt∈Amˆ
PW t
(∥∥ut + st +W t − uˆt∥∥
2
<
3
2
σ
√
t
)
(79)
Applying Proposition 2.9 to the first term, we obtain that, with probability at least 1− 2−δ32Rt/4 over the choice of
Π,
PW t,A
(
α
(
mˆ, V t
)
= A|M = m,St = st) (80)
≤ ǫ/2 + 2δ. (81)
+
1
|Am|
∑
ut∈Am\D(mˆ,s
t)
uˆt∈Amˆ
PW t
(∥∥ut + st − uˆt∥∥
2
− ∥∥W t∥∥
2
<
3
2
σ
√
t
)
(82)
≤ ǫ/2 + 2δ + 1|Am|
∑
ut∈Am\D(mˆ,s
t)
uˆt∈Amˆ
PW t
(∥∥W t∥∥
2
>
3
2
σ
√
t
)
. (83)
To bound the summand above, we note that
PW t
(∥∥W t∥∥
2
>
3
2
σ
√
t
)
= PW t
(
t∑
τ=1
W 2τ >
9
4
σ2t
)
(84)
= PW t
(
1
t
t∑
τ=1
W 2τ − σ2
σ2
>
5
4
)
(85)
≤ PW t
(
1
t
t∑
τ=1
W 2τ − σ2
σ2
> 1
)
≤ 2e−t/8. (86)
The last inequality above follows from standard bounds on the tail probability of chi-squared distribution. Continuing
the chain of inequalities from (83), we bound the number of (ut, uˆt) pairs in the sum by |Am|2 and use (86) and
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the assumption that R < 1/8 to obtain that, with probability at least 1 − 2−δ32Rt/4 over the choice of Π, for large
enough t,
PW t,A
(
α
(
mˆ, V t
)
= A|M = m,St = st) ≤ ǫ/2 + 2δ + 2δ2Rte−t/8 (87)
≤ ǫ/2 + 4δ (88)
≤ 9ǫ/10. (89)
Finally, we take a union bound over all m, mˆ ∈M and over a sufficiently dense set of state vectors st to conclude
that, with high probability over the choice of Π, PA(A,α) < ǫ.
In Propositions 2.8 and 2.9, we rely on the notation introduced in the proof of Lemma 2.7.
Proposition 2.8. For every mˆ ∈ M and st ∈ Rt, |D(mˆ, st)| ≤ δ2t˜.
Proof. Let ut ∈ D(mˆ, st). Thus, there exists uˆt ∈ Amˆ such that ‖ut + st − uˆt‖2 < 3σ
√
t. Consider any u˜t ∈
A \ {ut}. By property (D), ‖u˜t − ut‖2 ≥ 7σ
√
t. Thus, ‖u˜t + st − uˆt‖2 = ‖u˜t − ut + ut + st − uˆt‖2 ≥ ‖u˜t − ut‖2 −
‖ut + st − uˆt‖2 ≥ 4σ
√
t. Thus, for each uˆt ∈ Am, there is at most one ut ∈ A such that ‖ut − uˆt − st‖2 < 3σ
√
t,
which implies the claim of this proposition.
Proposition 2.9. Let m, mˆ ∈ M with m 6= mˆ and st ∈ Rt. With probability at least 1− 2−δ32Rt/4 over the random
choice of Π, |D(mˆ, st) ∩Am| ≤ (ǫ/2 + 2δ)δ2t˜.
Proof. We first fix the set Amˆ. Note that this also fixes the set Am ∩Amˆ as the image of the set Bm ∩Bmˆ under the
encoder mapping. Thus, ∣∣D(mˆ, st) ∩ Am ∩ Amˆ∣∣ ≤ |Am ∩ Amˆ| ≤ (ǫδ/2)2t˜. (90)
In the above, the last inequality follows from properties (A) and (B) in the proof of Lemma 2.7.
Next, we note that, conditioned on fixed choice of the setAmˆ and under the uniformly random choice of Π, the pro-
cess of drawing the setAm\Amˆ is equivalent to successively samplingK def= |Am\Amˆ| elements U t(1), U t(2), . . . , U t(k)
uniformly without replacement from the set A \ Amˆ. Note that, for large enough t˜,
δ2t˜/2
(a)
≤ δ(1 − ǫ/2)2t˜ − 1
(b)
≤ K
(c)
≤ δ2t˜. (91)
In the above, (a) is due to t˜ being large enough, and (b) and (c) follow from properties (A) and (B) of the code (B, β)
chosen in the proof of Lemma 2.7. Next, note that, for any k ∈ [1 : K] and large enough t˜, we have
p
def
= PΠ
(
U t(k) ∈ D(mˆ, st)) = |D(mˆ, st)||A \ Amˆ| (92)
≤ δ2
t˜
2t˜ − ⌊δ2t˜⌋ ≤
δ
1− δ − 2−t˜ ≤
3
2
δ. (93)
Thus,
PΠ
(∣∣D(mˆ, st) ∩ (Am \ Amˆ)∣∣ > 2δ22t˜) ≤ PΠ
(∣∣D(mˆ, st) ∩ (Am \ Amˆ)∣∣ > pK + 1
2
δ22t˜
)
(94)
= PΠ
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
1{Ut(k)∈D(mˆ,st)} − p > δ
22t˜
2K
)
(95)
≤ PΠ
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
1{Ut(k)∈D(mˆ,st)} − p > δ
2
)
. (96)
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Note that the probability term in (96) is the probability that the empirical average of the random variables
1{Ut(k)∈D(mˆ,st)}, drawn without replacement from a multi-set of size K containing pK ones and (1 − p)K zeroes,
deviates from its mean. By [28, Theorem 4], this probability is bounded from above by the corresponding probability
when each 1{Ut(k)∈D(mˆ,st)} is drawn with replacement from the same multi-set. By [28, Theorem 1] and (91), this
is bounded from above by 2−Kδ
2/2 ≤ 2−δ32t˜/4 for large enough values of t˜. Combining the above with the bound
obtained in (90), we prove the claim of the proposition.
F.2 Authenticated communication capacity for Gaussian AVCs
Using Lemma 2.7, we argue that the authenticated communication capacity of Gaussian AVCs is same as the
unauthenticated communication capacity.
Proof sketch for Theorem 2.5. The converse follows from the channel capacity converse for the nominal channel,
which is an additive Gaussian noise channel with input power constraint ρ and noise variance σ2. The achievability
follows by using a two phase code formed by concatenating a reliable communication code for the nominal channel
with an authentication code of positive rate for the additive Gaussian AVC from Lemma 2.7.
F.3 Authentication capacity for Gaussian AVCs
Next, using Theorem 2.5, we argue that the authentication capacity of Gaussian AVCs is same as the unauthenticated
communication capacity.
Proof sketch for Theorem 2.4. The proof is similar lines as Theorem 2.2. The converse follows by observing that
the authentication capacity for the given AVC is bounded from above by the identification capacity of the nominal
channel, i.e., the additive Gaussian noise channel with input power constraint ρ and noise variance σ2. By [17],
the latter equals (1/2) log
(
1 + ρ/σ2
)
. Similarly, the achievability follows by composing an identification code for the
noiseless channel (from [14]) with an authenticated communication code for the Gaussian AVC from Theorem 2.5.
F.4 Authenticated communication capacity region for Gaussian MACs
Finally, using Theorem 2.4, we show that the authenticated capacity region of Gaussian MACs is same as the
unauthenticated communication capacity.
Proof sketch for Theorem 2.3. The proof is similar lines as Theorem 2.1. The converse follows by observing that the
authenticated communication capacity region cannot be a superset of the (unauthenticated communication) capacity
region. The achievability follows from the same 3 phase idea as the the proof of Theorem 2.1, i.e., first transmit the
messages using a (unauthenticated) code for the Gaussian MAC. Next, in the second and third phases, the users
take turns transmitting authentication codes for their respective messages while a non-adversarial second user stays
silent (i.e., sends all 0’s).
G Equivalence of capacity regions of adversarial DM-MAC for codes
with stochastic encoders under maximum error probability and for
deterministic codes under average error probability
In this section, we will argue that the capacity region of the DM-MAC using codes with stochastic encoder (stochastic
codes) under maximum probability of error is the same as the capacity region using deterministic codes under average
probability of error criterion. Similar to Section 2.2.1.1, we define the average probability of error for a deterministic
code (f1, f2, φ) in terms of error probabilities under no attack and attack conditions as follows. Let x
n ∈ Xn be the
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sequence sent by user 1 when it (user 1) is adversarial and yn ∈ Yn be the sequence sent by user 2 when it (user 2)
is adversarial. Let (Mˆ1, Mˆ2) = φ(Z
n). For m1 ∈M1,m2 ∈ M2,
Pe,no attack,m1,m2(f1, f2, φ)
def
= P((Mˆ1, Mˆ2) 6= (m1,m2) |(M1,M2) = (m1,m2))
Pe,mal 1,m2,xn(f2, φ)
def
= P
(
Mˆ2 /∈ {m2,⊥} |M2 = m2, Xn = xn
)
,
Pe,mal 2,m1,yn(f1, φ)
def
= P
(
Mˆ1 /∈ {m1,⊥} |M1 = m1, Y n = yn
)
,
where the probabilities are over the channel. We define the average probability of error under attack and no attack
conditions as follow.
P¯e,no attack(f1, f2, φ)
def
=
∑
m1∈M1,m2∈M2
Pe,no attack,m1,m2(f1, f2, φ)
N1N2
,
P¯e,mal 1(f2, φ)
def
= max
xn∈Xn
∑
m2∈M2
Pe,mal 1,m2,xn(f2, φ)
N2
,
P¯e,mal 2(f1, φ)
def
= max
yn∈Yn
∑
m1∈M1
Pe,mal 2,m1,yn(f1, φ)
N1
.
The average probability of error of the deterministic code (f1, f2, φ) is defined as
P¯e(f1, f2, φ) = max
{
P¯e,no attack(f1, f2, φ), P¯e,mal 1(f2, φ), P¯e,mal 2(f1, φ)
}
.
The average probability of error for a stochastic code (F1, F2, φ) can also be defined in an analogous fashion. We will
use P¯e(F1, F2, φ) to refer to this average probability of error.
Lemma 2.10. Any rate pair achievable using stochastic codes under maximum probability of error criterion can
also be achieved using deterministic codes under average probability of error criterion.
Proof. The proof is along the lines of [3] [25, Theorem 12.13].
For any rate pair (R1, R2) ≥ 0, let (F1, F1, φ) be a
(
2nR1 , 2nR2 , n
)
stochastic code with Pe (F1, F1, φ) ≤ ǫ. This
also implies that P¯e (F1, F1, φ) ≤ ǫ. Define random variables Xm1 ,m1 ∈ M1 over Xn and Ym2 ,m2 ∈ M2 over
Yn, all independent of each other, as P(Xm1 = xn) = P(F1(m1) = xn) and P(Ym2 = yn) = P(F2(m2) = yn). For
(m1,m2) ∈ M1 ×M2, define a random variable Vm1,m2 as a function of the random variables Xm1 and Ym2 as
follows.
Vm1,m2
def
= ψm1,m2(Xm1 ,Ym2),
where for x˜n ∈ Xn, y˜n ∈ Yn,
ψm1,m2(x˜
n, y˜n)
def
= P (φ (Zn) 6= (m1,m2) |Xn = x˜n, Y n = y˜n ) ,
The probability above is over the channel. For (m1,m2) ∈ M1 ×M2 and xn ∈ Xn and yn ∈ Yn, we also define the
random variables Vm2,xn and Vm1,yn as functions of the random variables Xm1 and Ym2 as follows.
Vm2,xn = ψm2,xn(Ym2),
Vm1,yn = ψm1,yn(Xm1),
where for x˜n ∈ Xn and y˜n ∈ Yn,
ψm2,xn(y˜
n)
def
= P
(
Mˆ2 /∈ {m2,⊥} |Xn = xn, Y n = y˜n
)
,
ψm1,yn(x˜
n)
def
= P
(
Mˆ1 /∈ {m1,⊥} |Xn = x˜n, Y n = yn
)
.
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The probability above is over the channel. Let a > 0, and consider the probability of the event
{
1
N1N2
∑
m1,m2
Vm1,m2 ≥ aǫ
}
where the probability is over the randomness of Xm1 , m1 ∈ M1 and Ym2 , m2 ∈ M2.
P
{
1
N1N2
∑
m1,m2
Vm1,m2 ≥ aǫ
}
= P
{
2
∑
m1,m2
Vm1,m2 ≥ 2aǫN1N2
}
≤ 2−aǫN1N2
∏
m1,m2
E
[
2Vm1,m2
]
(a)
≤ 2−aǫN1N2
∏
m1,m2
3E[Vm1,m2 ]
= 2−aǫN1N2+log2 3(
∑
m1,m2
E[Vm1,m2 ])
Here, (a) follows by noting that for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, 2t ≤ 1+t ≤ 3t. Since P¯e (F1, F1, φ) ≤ ǫ, we have 1N1N2
∑
m1,m2
E [Vm1,m2 ] ≤
ǫ. Thus,
P
{
1
N1N2
∑
m1,m2
Vm1,m2 ≥ aǫ
}
≤ 2−N1N2ǫ(a−log2 3)
= 2−2
n(R1+R2)ǫ(a−log2 3)
Following the similar line of arguments, we can upper bound the following probability terms.
P
{
1
N2
∑
m2
Vm2,xn ≥ aǫ
}
≤ 2−2nR2ǫ(a−log2 3)
P
{
1
N1
∑
m1
Vm1,yn ≥ aǫ
}
≤ 2−2nR1ǫ(a−log2 3).
As before the probability in the above terms is over the randomness of Xm1 , m1 ∈ M1 and Ym2 , m2 ∈ M2. Thus,
P
({
1
N2
∑
m2
Vm2,xn ≥ aǫ for some xn ∈ Xn
}
∪
{
1
N1
∑
m1
Vm1,yn ≥ aǫ for some yn ∈ Yn
}
∪
{
1
N1N2
∑
m1,m2
Vm1,m2 ≥ aǫ
})
(a)
≤ |X |n2−2nR2ǫ(a−log2 3) + |Y|n2−2nR1ǫ(a−log2 3) + 2−2n(R1+R2)ǫ(a−log2 3)
≤ max {(2|X |+ 1)n, (2|Y|+ 1)n}2−2nmin{R1,R2}ǫ(a−log2 3)
< 1, for a = 2 and large enough n.
where (a) follows from union bound. Thus, there is some realization of the random variables Xm1 ,Ym2 ,m1 ∈
M1,m2 ∈M2 such that the average error probability is bounded by 2ǫ.
Let Rdetauth−comm be used to refer to the capacity region of the DM-MAC using deterministic codes under average
probability of error criterion.
Lemma 2.11. If the DM-MAC is not overwritable by both users, then Rdetauth−comm ⊆ Rnon−adv. Otherwise, if user
1 can overwrite user 2 but user 2 cannot overwrite user 1, Rdetauth−comm ⊆ {(R, 0), (R, 0) ∈ Rnon−adv}. When user
2 can overwrite user 1 but user 1 cannot overwrite user 2, Rdetauth−comm ⊆ {(0, R), (0, R) ∈ Rnon−adv}. When both
users can overwrite each other, Rdetauth−comm = {(0, 0)}.
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Proof. We first consider the case when one of the users, say user 1, can overwrite the other user while user 2 is
honest. Suppose some rate pair (R1, R2), R1 > 0, R2 > 0 is achievable. Consider the adversarial strategy QXn(x
n)
where user 1 overwrites every sequence sent out by user 2 by an encoding of a uniformly chosen message M2 from
M2 while pretending to send an encoding of a uniformly chosen message M1 from m1 ∈ M1 i.e., the output
distribution of user 2, QXn(x
n) = 1N1N2
∑
m′1∈M1,m
′
2∈M2
∏n
i=1
(∑
x∈X PX′|X,Y (x|f1(m′1)i, f2(m′2)i)
)
where f1(m
′
1)i
and f2(m
′
2)i are i
th elements of f1(m
′
1) and f2(m
′
2) sequences respectively and PX′|X,Y satisfies (46). For m1 ∈ M1
and m2 ∈ M2, let φ−1(m1,m2) = {zn : φ(zn) = (m1,m2)} and φ−12 (m2) = {zn : φ(zn) = (m˜1,m2), m˜1 ∈ M1} and
φ−12 (⊥) = {zn : φ(zn) = (⊥,⊥)}. Then,
P¯e (f1, f1, φ) ≥ 1
N2
∑
xn∈Xn,m2∈M2
QXn(x
n)Pe,mal 1,m2,xn(f2, φ)
=
1
N2
∑
m2
1
N1N2
∑
m′1∈M1,m
′
2∈M2
n∏
i=1
(∑
x∈X
PX′|X,Y (x|f1(m′1)i, f2(m′2)i)
)
P
(
Mˆ2 /∈ {m2,⊥}|Xn = xn, Y n = f2(m2)
)
=
1
N2
∑
m2
1
N1N2
∑
m′1∈M1,m
′
2∈M2
∑
zn /∈φ−12 (m2)∪φ
−1
2 (⊥)
n∏
i=1
(∑
x∈X
PX′|X,Y (x|f1(m′1)i, f2(m′2)i)W (zi|xi, f2(m2)i)
)
(a)
=
1
N2
∑
m2
1
N1N2
∑
m′1∈M1,m
′
2∈M2
∑
zn /∈φ−12 (m2)∪φ
−1
2 (⊥)
n∏
i=1
W (zi|f1(m′1)i, f2(m′2)i)
≥ 1
N2
∑
m2
1
N1N2
∑
m′1,m
′
2 6=m2
∑
zn /∈φ−12 (m2)∪φ
−1
2 (⊥)
n∏
i=1
W (zi|f1(m′1)i, f2(m′2)i)
(b)
≥ 1
N2
∑
m2
1
N1N2
∑
m′1,m
′
2 6=m2
∑
zn∈φ−1(m′1,m
′
2)
n∏
i=1
W (zi|f1(m′1)i, f2(m′2)i)
=
1
N1N2
∑
m′1,m
′
2
∑
zn∈φ−1(m′1,m
′
2)
n∏
i=1
W (zi|f1(m′1)i, f2(m′2)i)
∑
m2 6=m′2
1
N2
= (1− P¯e,no attack(f1, f2, φ))N2 − 1
N2
,
where (a) follows from (46) and (b) follows by observing that for m′2 6= m2, φ−1(m′1,m′2) ⊆ φ−12 (m′2) ⊆ Zn \
(φ−12 (m2) ∪ φ−12 (⊥)). The above lower bound implies that P¯e (f1, f1, φ)N2 + (N2 − 1)P¯e,no attack(f1, f2, φ) ≥ N2 − 1.
We further observe that
P¯e (f1, f1, φ) (2N2 − 1) ≥ P¯e (f1, f1, φ)N2 + (N2 − 1)P¯e,no attack(f1, f2, φ) ≥ N2 − 1.
and thus, P¯e (f1, f1, φ) ≥ N2−12N2−1 which is bounded away from zero for all N2 > 1. Similarly, we can argue that when
sender 2 can overwrite sender 1, the average error is bounded away from 0 for all N1 > 1. This also implies that
when both users can overwrite each other, Rdetauth−comm = {(0, 0)}.
Lemma 2.12. The capacity region of the adversarial multiple access channel DM-MAC using deterministic codes
under average probability of error criterion is same as the capacity region using codes with stochastic encoder using
maximum probability of error criterion.
Proof. The achievability follows from Lemma 2.10 and the converse follows from Lemma 2.11.
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f (n) WV |U,S φ(n)m
Un V n
mˆ/⊥
Sn
Figure 10: Authenticated communication over an AVC WV |U,S
H Authenticated Communication over AVCs
In this section, we revisit the authenticated communication setup of [15] and show that any rate achievable using
deterministic codes under average probability of error criterion is also achievable using codes with stochastic encoder
under maximum probability of error criterion. Consider the system model given in Fig. 10.
Definition 2.8. An (N,n) deterministic authenticated communication code consists of the following:
1. A message set M = {1, 2, . . . , N},
2. A deterministic encoder f (n) :M→ Un,
3. A deterministic decoder φ(n) : Vn →M∪ {⊥}.
For m ∈ M and sn ∈ Sn, define probability of error as
edetm
(
f (n), φ(n), sn
)
=
{
P
(
φ(n) (V n) 6= m ∣∣Un = f (n)(m), Sn = sn0 ) , sn = sn0 ,
P
(
φ(n) (V n) /∈ {m,⊥} ∣∣Un = f (n)(m), Sn = sn ) , sn 6= sn0 ,
and let
edetm
(
f (n), φ(n)
)
= max
sn∈Sn
edetm
(
f (n), φ(n), sn
)
.
The average probability of error e¯det
(
f (n), φ(n)
)
is defined as
e¯det
(
f (n), φ(n)
)
= max
sn∈Sn
1
N
∑
m∈M
edetm
(
f (n), φ(n), sn
)
.
The maximum probability of error edet
(
f (n), φ(n)
)
is defined as
edet
(
f (n), φ(n)
)
= max
m∈M
edetm
(
f (n), φ(n)
)
.
An (N,n) random code
(
F (n),Φ(n)
)
and an (N,n) stochastic code
(
F (n), φ(n)
)
can be defined in a similar manner. The
average error and the maximum error for a random code will be denoted by e¯rand
(
F (n),Φ(n)
)
and erand
(
F (n),Φ(n)
)
respectively. The average error and the maximum error for a code with stochastic encoder will be denoted by
e¯
(
F (n), φ(n)
)
and e
(
F (n), φ(n)
)
respectively. An authenticated communication rate R is achievable using deter-
ministic codes under average probability of error criterion if there exists a sequence of codes
{
f (n), φ(n)
}∞
n=1
such
that limn→∞ e¯
det
(
f (n), φ(n)
) → 0. We define Cdetauth−comm as the supremum of all achievable rates. We can give
an analogous definition of authentication communication capacity (denoted by Cauth−comm) using stochastic codes
under maximum probability of error criterion. Let C(s0) denote the no-adversary capacity of the adversarial channel
WV |U,S defined as C(s0)
def
= maxPU I(U ;V |S = s0). The main result of [15] is
Theorem 2.13. [15, Theorem 2] If the channel is non-overwritable (i.e., (50) does not hold), Cdetauth−comm = C(s0);
if it is overwritable, then Cdetauth−comm = 0.
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In this section, we will show an analogous result for stochsatic codes under maximum probability of error criterion.
Proposition 2.14. If the channel is non-overwritable (i.e., (50) does not hold), Cauth−comm = C(s0); if it is
overwritable, then Cauth−comm = 0.
Proof. Converse:Any good stochastic code (under maximum probability of error criterion) for the adversarial channel
WV |U,S is also a good code for the nominal channel WV |U,S(.|., s0). Thus, Cauth−comm ≤ C(s0). When the channel
is overwritable, suppose some R > 0 is achievable. For ut ∈ U t and m ∈ M, define the distribution QUt|M (ut|m) def=
P(F (n)(m) = ut). Let m,m′ ∈ M,m 6= m′ be two distinct messages. Consider the adversarial strategy PSt(st) =∑
u˜t∈Ut QUt|M (u˜
t|m′)∏ti=1 PS|U ′(si|u˜i). Here, si and u˜i are the ith elements of the sn and u˜n sequences respectively
and PS|U ′ satisfies (50).
Let em→m′
(
F (n), φ(n)
)
be the probability that the decoder outputs m′ under the adversarial attack described
above when m was actually sent and em,s0
(
F (n), φ(n)
)
be the probability with which the decoder outputs some
message m˜ ∈M\ {m} or ⊥, when m was actually sent and there was no attack. For m ∈M, let φ(n)−1(m) def= {vt :
φ(n)(vt) = m}. Then,
em→m′
(
F (n), φ(n)
)
=
∑
ut∈Ut
QUt|M (u
t|m)
∑
st∈St
PSt(s
t)
∑
vt∈φ(n)−1(m′)
t∏
i=1
W (vi|ui, si)
=
∑
ut∈Ut,vt∈φ(n)−1(m′)
QUt|M (u
t|m)
∑
u˜t∈Ut
QUt|M (u˜
t|m′)
∑
st∈St
t∏
i=1
PS|U ′(si|u˜i)W (vi|ui, si)
(a)
=
∑
ut∈Ut,vt∈φ(n)−1(m′)
QUt|M (u
t|m)
∑
u˜t∈Ut
Q(u˜t|m′)
t∏
i=1
W (vi|u˜i, s0)
=
∑
u˜t∈Ut,vt∈φ(n)−1(m′)
QUt|M (u˜
t|m′)
t∏
i=1
W (vi|u˜i, s0)
= 1− em′,s0
(
F (n), φ(n)
)
,
where (a) follows from (50). This implies that em→m′
(
F (n), φ(n)
)
+ em′,s0
(
F (n), φ(n)
)
= 1. Hence, 2e
(
F (n), φ(n)
) ≥
1. This implies that N ≤ 1 for any (N,n)-stochastic authenticated communication code with e (F (n), φ(n)) < 12 .
Therefore, Cauth−comm is zero.
The other part of this proposition follows from Theorem 2.13 and Lemma 2.15 (stated below).
Lemma 2.15. Any rate R > 0 of authenticated communication achievable using deterministic codes under average
probability of error criterion can also be achieved using codes with stochastic encoder under maximum probability
of error criterion.
Proof. This proof borrows ideas from [3] [25, Theorem 12.13]. We will prove the lemma in three steps. Firstly,
given a positive rate deterministic code under average error probability criterion, we will construct a random code
(i.e., a code with shared randomness at encoder and decoder unknown to the adversary) that achieves the same
rate under maximum error probability criterion. Then, we will use a random code reduction argument along the
lines of [26] [25, Lemma 12.8] to reduce the given random code to another random code with support only over
polynomially many deterministic codes. Lastly, we will use a positive rate deterministic code under average error
probability criterion to share this small amount of randomness required with the decoder and use this to construct
a stochastic code.
Suppose R > 0 is achievable using deterministic codes under average probability of error criterion. Then, let
(f (n), φ(n)) be a (2nR, n) deterministic code with
e¯det
(
f (n), φ(n)
)
≤ ǫ.
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Define a (2nR, n) random code (F (n),Φ(n)) as follows. Let πn be the set of all permutations ofM. Let σ ∼ Unif(πn).
The encoder is given by
F (n)(m) = f (n) (σ (m)) , m ∈ M.
For vn ∈ Vn, the decoder is defined as
Φ(n) (vn) =
{
σ−1
(
φ(n) (vn)
)
, φ(n) (vn) ∈M,
⊥, φ(n) (vn) = ⊥.
For m ∈M, probability of error for this random code is
erandm
(
F (n),Φ(n)
)
=
1
N
∑
m′∈M
edetm′
(
f (n), φ(n)
)
≤ ǫ.
Thus,
erand
(
F (n),Φ(n)
)
= max
m
erandm
(
F (n),Φ(n)
)
≤ ǫ.
We will use the following random code reduction lemma which will be proved later.
Lemma 2.16. Let (F (n),Φ(n)) ∼ Q be a random code. Assume |S| <∞. Then, for every
ǫ > 2 log
(
1 + erand
(
F (n),Φ(n)
))
and k >
2
ǫ
(logN + n log |S|),
there exists a family of (deterministic) codes {(f (n)i , φ(n)i )}ki=1 such that
1
k
k∑
i=1
edetm (f
(n)
i , φ
(n)
i , s
n) < ǫ for every m ∈M and sn ∈ Sn. (97)
Invoking the above lemma on the random code
(
F (n),Φ(n)
)
with k = n2, for large enough n, we get a sequence
of codes
{(
f
(n)
i , φ
(n)
i
)}k
i=1
satisfying
1
n2
n2∑
i=1
edetm
(
f
(n)
i , φ
(n)
i , s
n
)
< ǫ for every m ∈M and sn ∈ Sn. (98)
Since by assumption, positive authenticated communication rates are achievable, we see that for large n, there exists
a sequence of
(
n2, ln
)
codes
(
f˜ (ln), φ˜(ln)
)
with limn→∞
ln
n → 0 and satisfying
e¯det
(
f˜ (ln), φ(ln)
)
≤ ǫ.
We define a
(
2nR, n+ ln
)
stochastic code
(
F (n+ln), φ(n+ln)
)
as follows: For J ∼ Unif[1 : n2] and m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2nR},
let the stochastic encoder map be
F (n+ln)(m) =
(
f˜ (ln)(J), f
(n)
J (m)
)
.
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For vn+ln ∈ Vn+ln , the decoder map is defined as
φ(n+ln)(vn+ln) =
{
m if φ(ln)
(
vln
)
= i and φ
(n)
i
(
vn+lnln+1
)
= m for some i ∈ [1 : n2] and m ∈ [1 : 2nR] ,
⊥ otherwise.
For m ∈M, under no attack, the probability of error is
em
(
F (n+ln), φ(n+ln), sn+ln0
)
= P
(
φ(n+ln)
(
V n+ln
) 6= m ∣∣∣Un+ln = F (n+ln)(m), Sn+ln = sn+ln0 )
=
1
n2
n2∑
i=1
P
({
φ(n+ln)
(
V n+ln
) 6= m} ∣∣∣J = i, Un+ln = (f˜ (ln)(i), f (n)i (m)) , Sn+ln = sn+ln0 )
=
1
n2
n2∑
i=1
(
P
({
φ(n+ln)
(
V n+ln
) 6= m} ∩ {φ(ln) (V ln) = i} ∣∣∣J = i, Un+ln = (f˜ (ln)(i), f (n)i (m)) , Sn+ln = sn+ln0 )
+ P
({
φ(n+ln)
(
V n+ln
) 6= m} ∩ {φ(ln) (V ln) 6= i} ∣∣∣J = i, Un+ln = (f˜ (ln)(i), f (n)i (m)) , Sn+ln = sn+ln0 ))
≤ 1
n2
n2∑
i=1
(
P
({
φ
(n)
i
(
V n+lnln+1
)
6= m
} ∣∣∣J = i, Un+ln = (f˜ (ln)(i), f (n)i (m)) , Sn+ln = sn+ln0 , φ(ln) (V ln) = i)
+ P
({
φ(ln)
(
V ln
) 6= i} ∣∣∣J = i, Un+ln = (f˜ (ln)(i), f (n)i (m)) , Sn+ln = sn+ln0 ))
=
1
n2
n2∑
i=1
edetm
(
f
(n)
i , φ
(n)
i , s
n
0
)
+
1
n2
n2∑
i=1
edeti
(
f˜ (ln), φ(ln), sln0
)
≤ ǫ+ ǫ
= 2ǫ.
Suppose the adversary uses the state sequence sn+ln ∈ Sn+ln , sn+ln 6= sn+ln0 . The probability of error (under attack)
is
em
(
F (n+ln), φ(n+ln), sn+ln
)
= P
(
φ(n+ln)
(
V n+ln
)
/∈ {m,⊥}
∣∣∣Xn+ln = F (n+ln)(m), Sn+ln = sn+ln )
=
1
n2
n2∑
i=1
P
({
φ(n+ln)
(
V n+ln
)
/∈ {m,⊥}
} ∣∣∣J = i,Xn+ln = (f˜ (ln)(i), f (n)i (m)) , Sn+ln = sn+ln )
=
1
n2
n2∑
i=1
(
P
({
φ(n+ln)
(
V n+ln
)
/∈ {m,⊥}
}
∩
{
φ(ln)
(
V ln
)
= i
} ∣∣∣J = i, Un+ln = (f˜ (ln)(i), f (n)i (m)) , Sn+ln = sn+ln )
+ P
({
φ(n+ln)
(
V n+ln
)
/∈ {m,⊥}
}
∩
{
φ(ln)
(
V ln
)
= ⊥
} ∣∣∣J = i, Un+ln = (f˜ (ln)(i), f (n)i (m)) , Sn+ln = sn+ln )
+ P
({
φ(n+ln)
(
V n+ln
)
/∈ {m,⊥}
}
∩
{
φ(ln)
(
V ln
) 6= {i,⊥}} ∣∣∣J = i, Un+ln = (f˜ (ln)(i), f (n)i (m)) , Sn+ln = sn+ln ))
≤ 1
n2
n2∑
i=1
(
P
({
φ
(n)
i
(
V n+lnln+1
)
/∈ {m,⊥}
} ∣∣∣J = i, Un+ln = (f˜ (ln)(i), f (n)i (m)) , Sn+ln = sn+ln , φ(ln) (V ln) = i)
+ 0 + P
({
φ(ln)
(
V ln
) 6= {i,⊥}}∣∣∣J = i, Un+ln = (f˜ (ln)(i), f (n)i (m)) , Sn+ln = sn+ln ))
≤ 1
n2
n2∑
i=1
edetm
(
f
(n)
i , φ
(n)
i , s
n+ln
ln+1
)
+
1
n2
n2∑
i=1
edeti
(
f˜ (ln), φ(ln), sln
)
≤ ǫ+ ǫ
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= 2ǫ.
Thus,
e
(
F (n+ln), φ(n+ln)
)
= max
m
max
sn+ln∈Sn+ln
em
(
F (n+ln), φ(n+ln), sn+ln
)
≤ 2ǫ.
Let {ǫk}∞k=1 be a decreasing sequence of positive numbers with limk→∞ ǫk → 0. For each ǫk, k ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, we
can find an n such that there exists a (2nR, n + ln) stochastic codes for the adversarial channel WV |U,S such that
e
(
F (n+ln), φ(n+ln)
) ≤ 2ǫk. In fact, it is possible to find a sequence of (2nR, n+ln) codes with limn→∞ e (F (n+ln), φ(n+ln))→
0 and limn→∞
logN
n+ln
→ R.
It remains to prove Lemma 2.16.
Proof of Lemma 2.16. The proof is along the lines of [26] [25, Lemma 12.8]. We include it here for completeness.
Draw k independent samples {(F (n)i ,Φ(n)i )}ki=1 with distribution Q. For m ∈M and sn ∈ Sn,
P
(
1
k
k∑
i=1
edetm
(
F
(n)
i ,Φ
(n)
i , s
n
)
≥ ǫ
)
= P
(
2
∑k
i=1 e
det
m
(
F
(n)
i ,Φ
(n)
i ,s
n
)
≥ 2kǫ
)
(a)
≤ 2−kǫE
[
2
∑k
i=1 e
det
m
(
F
(n)
i ,Φ
(n)
i ,s
n
)]
(b)
= ≤2−kǫ
(
E
[
2
edetm
(
F
(n)
1 ,Φ
(n)
1 ,s
n
)])k
(c)
≤ ≤2−kǫ
(
E
[
1 + edetm
(
F
(n)
1 ,Φ
(n)
1 , s
n
)])k
(d)
= ≤2−kǫ
(
1 +E
[
edetm
(
F
(n)
1 ,Φ
(n)
1 , s
n
)])k
= ≤2−kǫ
(
1 + erandm
(
F (n),Φ(n), sn
))k
= 2−k(ǫ−log2(1+e
rand
m (F
(n),Φ(n),sn))).
Here, (a) follows by Markov’s inequality, (b) follows because {(F (n)i ,Φ(n)i )}ki=1 is an independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) sequence and (c) follows because 2z ≤ 1 + z for 0 ≤ z ≤ 1.
P
(
1
k
k∑
i=1
edetm
(
F
(n)
i ,Φ
(n)
i , s
n
)
< ǫ for every m ∈ M and sn ∈ Sn
)
= 1− P

 ∪
m∈M
sn∈Sn
{
1
k
k∑
i=1
edetm (F
(n)
i ,Φ
(n)
i , s
n) ≥ ǫ
}
≥ 1−
∑
m∈M, sn∈Sn
exp
(
−k
(
ǫ− log
(
1 + erandm
(
F (n),Φ(n), sn
))))
≥ 1−
∑
m∈M, sn∈Sn
exp
(
−k
(
ǫ− log
(
1 + erand
(
F (n),Φ(n)
))))
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= 1−N |S|n exp
(
−k
(
ǫ − log
(
1 + erand
(
F (n),Φ(n)
))))
> 0
This guarantees the existence of a sequence of codes {(f (n)i , φ(n)i )}ki=1 satisfying the error criterion (97).
References
[1] D. Blackwell, L. Breiman, and A. J. Thomasian, “The capacities of certain channel classes under random coding,”
Annals Math. Stat., 31:558-567, 1960.
[2] J. H. Jahn, “Coding of arbitrarily varying multiuser channels,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, 27:212–226, 1981.
[3] R. Ahlswede, “Elimination of correlation in random codes for arbitrarily varying channels,” Zeitschrift fu¨r
Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie und verwandte Gebiete, 44(2): 159-175, 1978.
[4] J. A. Gubner, “On the deterministic-code capacity of the multiple-access arbitrarily varying channel,” IEEE
Trans. Inform. Theory, 36:262–275, 1990.
[5] R. Ahlswede and N. Cai, “Arbitrarily varying multiple-access channels. I. Ericson’s symmetrizability is adequate,
Gubner’s conjecture is true,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 45(2):742–749, 1999.
[6] U. Pereg and Y. Steinberg, “The capacity region of the arbitrarily varying MAC: with and without constraints,”
arXiv:1901:00939v1, 2019.
[7] M. Wiese and H. Boche, “The arbitrarily varying multiple-access channel with conferencing encoders,” IEEE
Trans. Inform. Theory 59(3):1405–1416, 2013.
[8] R. J. La and V. Anantharam, “A game-theoretic look at the Gaussian multiaccess channel,” DIMACS series in
discrete mathematics and theoretical computer science, 66:87-106, 2004.
[9] N. Sangwan, M. Bakshi, B. Dey, and V. Prabhakaran, “Multiple access channels with adversarial users,” ac-
cepted, ISIT 2019.
[10] O. Kosut, L. Tong and D. N. C. Tse, “Polytope Codes Against Adversaries in Networks, ” IEEE Trans. Inform.
Theory, 60:3308-44, 2014.
[11] S. Jaggi, M. Langberg, S. Katti, T. Ho, D. Katabi and M. Me´dard, “Resilient network coding in the presence
of byzantine adversaries,” in Proc. INFOCOM 2007, pp. 616-624.
[12] D. Wang, D. Silva, and F. R. Kschischang, “Robust network coding in the presence of untrusted nodes,” IEEE
Trans. Inform. Theory, 56(9):4532–4538, 2010.
[13] I. Csisza´r and P. Narayan, “The capacity of the arbitrarily varying channel revisited: positivity, constraints,”
IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 34(2):181-193, Mar. 1988.
[14] R. Ahlswede and G. Dueck, “Identification via channels,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, 35(1):15-29, Jan. 1989.
[15] O. Kosut and J. Kliewer, “Authentication capacity of adversarial channels,” in Proc. Information Theory Work-
shop, Guangzhou, 2018.
[16] L. A. Bassalygo, M. V. Burnashev, “Authentication, Identification, and Pairwise Separated Measures,” Problems
Inform. Transmission, 32(1):3339, 1996.
54
[17] M. V. Burnashev, ”On identification capacity of infinite alphabets or continuous-time channels,” IEEE Trans.
Inform. Theory, 46(7):2407-2414, Nov. 2000.
[18] H. Boche and C. Deppe, “Secure identification under passive eavesdroppers and active jamming attacks,” IEEE
Trans. Inform. Forensics and Security, 14:472-485, Feb. 2019.
[19] G. J. Simmons, “Authentication theory/coding theory,” in Proc. Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO 1984, pp.
411-431.
[20] U. M. Maurer, “Authentication theory and hypothesis testing,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, 46(4):1350-1356,
Jul. 2000.
[21] L. Lai, H. El Gamal and H. V. Poor, “Authentication over noisy channels,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory,
55(2):906-916, Feb. 2009.
[22] W. Tu and L. Lai, “Keyless authentication and authenticated capacity,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, 64(5):3696-
3714, May 2018.
[23] X. He and A. Yener, “Strong secrecy and reliable byzantine detection in the presence of an untrusted relay,”
IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, 59(1):177-192, Jan. 2013.
[24] N. Cai, “The maximum error probability criterion, random encoder, and feedback, in multiple input channels,”
Entropy, 16(3):1211-1242, Feb. 2014.
[25] I. Csisza´r and J. Ko¨rner, Information Theory: Coding Theorems for Discrete Memoryless Systems. Cambridge
University Press, 2011.
[26] R. Ahlswede and J. Wolfowitz, “Correlated decoding for channels with arbitrarily varying channel probability
functions,” Information and Control, 14: 457-473, 1969.
[27] N. Blachman, “On the capacity of a band-limited channel perturbed by statistically dependent interference,”
IRE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 48-55, January 1962.
[28] W. Hoeffding, “Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables,” Journal of the American
Statistical Association, vol. 58, no. 301, 1963.
55
